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Early in my career as a public defender I represented a young
man charged with rape. The police report indicated that he followed
the victim off a city bus and forced her at knife point to a dark
playground, where he raped her. My client told me that the woman
was a prostitute and that after intercourse they squabbled over the
sum he was to pay her. She became angry and cried "rape."
When I returned to my office I discovered from our client index
that we had represented the woman on prostitution charges several
times in the past. My supervisor instructed me to continue to rep-
resent the accused. He suggested that I look through the woman's
old files and stated that I could use any information I found in them
for cross-examination, if the information could have been obtained
from independent sources, unconnected with our prior representation
of the witness. When I reviewed her files I found very useful mate-
rial for cross-examination in some police reports and a probation
report.
I proceeded to cross-examine the woman extensively on her prosti-
tution activity, relying on some of the leads obtained in her files. She
became quite upset and literally came apart on the stand, although
she continued to maintain that she had been raped. I went home that
night feeling miserable, thinking how upset the woman was. My cli-
ent was found guilty of a lesser offense, but the judge sentenced him
to the Youth Authority anyway. We all emerged from court as
losers."
The lawyer in the illustration faced a difficult dilemma. The informa-
tion he used to cross-examine the witness came into his possession as a
result of a professional relationship. The witness had entered that rela-
tionship with the assumption that the public defender office would use the
data in her files exclusively for her benefit. Embarrassing her with the
information potentially diminished her trust in lawyers and her willing-
ness to cooperate fully with counsel in any future situation in which she
might need legal assistance.
On the other hand, the lawyer had an ethical duty to represent his
current client competently and zealously.3 The Sixth Amendment obli-
gated the public defender to investigate leads to admissible evidence that
would tend to disprove or discredit the witness's testimony.4 Failure to
pursue valuable defense evidence or to cross-examine the witness thor-
1. This account was provided by a former assistant public defender in Alameda County, Califor-
nia. The court proceeding took place in juvenile court in Oakland, California in December 1970.
2. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1982).
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 6 & 7 (1982).
4. See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250-58 (5th Cir. 1982); Coles v. Peyton, 389
F.2d 224, 225-26 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033,
1041-43, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638-39, 472 P.2d 921, 926-27 (1970); Harris v. United States, 441 A.2d
268, 272 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982).
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oughly might have compromised the lawyer's duty to his current client.
Moreover, if the public defender had withdrawn from the case, the with-
drawal could have diminished the accused's opportunity for an acquittal.
Substitute counsel might not have been able to gather the information in
question from independent sources, particularly under the limited crimi-
nal discovery rules of most jurisdictions.5 These considerations convinced
the lawyer to use the information during cross-examination.
The illustration also highlights difficult problems regularly confronting
the courts. The defender chose to remain in the case and cross-examine
the witness with some, but not all, of the information he found in her file.
Should a reviewing court reverse the defendant's conviction on the ground
that counsel failed to pursue all avenues of cross-examination?' Should
the lawyer's divided loyalty and his failure to withdraw from the case
require a new trial with independent counsel, regardless of whether the
defender restrained his cross-examination? If the trial court had become
aware of the prior representation, could the judge have disqualified de-
fense counsel over objection without infringing the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to continue with the counsel of his choice? If the de-
fender had moved to withdraw from the case, would the court have been
obligated to grant the motion?
This Article addresses these questions. Part I presents an empirical
study of the frequency with which criminal defense lawyers confront their
former clients as prosecution witnesses. The study suggests that the prob-
lem of divided loyalty raised by the illustration is commonplace for law-
yers with an active criminal practice. Part II analyzes a nationwide survey
of public defender offices to determine how counsel actually handle the
problem. The survey shows a diversity of views concerning the appropri-
ate action. Part III concludes that lawyers' confusion in successive repre-
sentation situations reflects the ambiguity of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility on this issue. Part IV analyzes judicial treatment of
5. Probation Department pre-sentence investigation reports concerning persons other than the de-
fendant, as well as police reports for cases not involving the defendant, are not among the discoverable
items enumerated in the rules of any state or federal court. See, e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 16; ARIz. R.
CRIM. P. 15; CoLo. R. CRiM. P. 16; ILL SuP. CT. R. 412; OHio R. GRIM. P. 16; PA. R. GRIM. P.
305. The state courts generally do not permit discovery of such items as probation reports on prosecu-
tion witnesses, except perhaps under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecutorial sup-
pression of evidence violates due process where evidence is material to guilt or punishment). See also
Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 732-33, 375 N.E.2d 681, 687 (1978) (upholding trial
court denial of criminal and probation records of prosecution witnesses, but suggesting the records are
discoverable under some circumstances).
6. Appellate courts normally will not reverse a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of
counsel when the defense lawyer fails to pursue a line of cross-examination, if counsel's decision rests
on "tactical grounds." See United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974). How-
ever, if a failure to cross-examine thoroughly can be traced to the divided loyalties of defense counsel,
the result might be different. See Brown v. United States, 665 F.2d 271, 273 (9th Cir. 1982) (Tang,
J., concurring).
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post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in situations in
which prosecution witnesses are former clients of the defendant's trial
lawyer. It concludes that the courts have not followed coherent rules, and
it offers a framework to resolve problems of divided loyalty.
I. THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
CONFRONT FORMER CLIENTS AS PROSECUTION WITNESSES: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Preliminary Observations
A criminal defense attorney normally must retain a defendant's office
file long after the conclusion of the client's case." The files of former cli-
ents, sometimes referred to as "closed" files or "dead" files, frequently
include a wealth of information regarding those clients and the circum-
stances surrounding their cases. A typical file might contain police reports,
arrest records, a probation officer's pre-sentence investigation report, notes
of interviews with witnesses in the former client's case, psychiatric reports,
data regarding the former client's family and friends, information con-
cerning the former client's use of drugs and alcohol, hospital records, and
notations of discussions with the prosecutor, police, the court, the proba-
tion officer, and the client's family, employer, or friends. Much of this
material could be detrimental or embarrassing to the former client in the
hands of an adversary. The information could significantly increase the
effectiveness of a hostile cross-examination of the former client.
Despite a substantial body of appellate decisions concerning the poten-
tial conflict of interest when a criminal lawyer cross-examines a former
client,8 little is known about the frequency of this practice. Nor have re-
searchers systematically examined how lawyers actually exercise their
professional judgment in deciding whether to cross-examine a former cli-
ent, how to avoid ethical problems when preparing and conducting cross-
examination, and whether to use information learned in the course of an
earlier lawyer-client relationship for the benefit of the current accused.
Answers to these questions would be useful both for an analysis of
whether existing rules of professional responsibility provide sufficient
7. The lawyer's notes and records may be essential for a variety of subsequent proceedings. For
example, the judgment may be appealed immediately or may be collaterally attacked years later. The
defendant may petition the court to reduce his sentence or expunge his records long after conviction. If
the defendant has been placed on probation or parole, subsequent proceedings for revocation may, and
frequently do, occur. Even when a convicted defendant is no longer on probation or parole, he may
wish to petition the court for a restoration of his civil rights. Finally, a dispute may arise between
counsel and a former client over a matter related to the representation.
8. See Part IV, infra, for a discussion of these decisions.
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guidance to practitioners, and for determining whether court procedures
adequately protect the rights of both witnesses and defendants.
Understanding the frequency and magnitude of successive representa-
tion problems would be especially helpful in deciding whether to establish
court procedures similar to those followed in joint representation cases.
Joint representation of co-defendants in criminal cases also involves a sub-
stantial risk of conflict of interest.9 Thus, trial judges in many jurisdic-
tions are required to explain the risks of divided loyalty to jointly repre-
sented co-defendants and to determine if each defendant has made an
intelligent decision to proceed with shared counsel. 10 This procedure helps
to assure adequate protection of each co-defendant's constitutional right to
a lawyer with undivided loyalty.1
A similar rule could be applied whenever a former client of defense
counsel is scheduled to testify for the government. However, one critical
difference between joint representation and successive representation could
make implementation of such a rule in the latter situation both costly and
burdensome. Although the very fact of joint representation immediately
alerts the trial court to the risk that a conflict of interest may develop,
both the trial judge and the accused may be unaware that defense counsel
faces a potential conflict because of an undisclosed prior representation of
a key prosecution witness. A preventative rule would require the govern-
ment to disclose the identity of its witnesses to the defense before trial, and
would require defense counsel to notify the court promptly of any earlier
representation. The substitutions of counsel occasioned by such a rule
might result in further expense and delay.12
These problems do not preclude the adoption of a court-imposed proce-
dure to minimize the risk of a conflict of interest resulting from successive
representation. However, implementation of a procedural rule that may
result in expense and delay should be based on a demonstration that the
problem is of significant magnitude. The benefits of a procedural change
outweigh the costs only if successive representation in fact occurs in a sig-
9. See United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring);
United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring), cerl. denied, 429
U.S. 941 (1976); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5(b)
(Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; Geer, Representation of Multiple
Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attor-
ney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119, 136 (1978); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A
Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REv. 939, 961-63 (1978).
10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975); State
v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 903-08 (Minn. 1977). But see Geer, supra note 9, at 141-42; Tague,
Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interests in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1113-14
(1979).
11. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1975).
12. The implementation of such a rule is discussed in more detail infra pp. 43-44.
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nificant number of cases and criminal lawyers treat the resulting problems
improperly.
B. Format and Scope of the Frequency Study
To determine how often criminal defense lawyers confront their former
clients as prosecution witnesses, the author studied cases handled by the
Office of the Maricopa County Public Defender in Phoenix, Arizona,
during a recent six-month period.13 The study consisted of a review of
court records in all prosecutions for four specified crimes of violence"' in
which the Public Defender Office served as counsel of record. Investiga-
tors recorded the names and addresses of all crime victims and other civil-
ian witnesses subpoenaed by the government, and then compared the
names, addresses, and other available indicia of the witnesses' identifica-
tion with public defender records to determine which witnesses were for-
mer or current clients of the defender office.
The working hypothesis of the study was that a significant percentage
of lay witnesses subpoenaed to testify against the accused in these prosecu-
tions were former clients of the Public Defender Office. Other studies
have shown that victims and offenders in violent crimes frequently come
from similar socio-economic backgrounds,' 5 and that victims of violent
crimes tend to have prior arrest records themselves, often for violent con-
duct.as In many cities, one defender agency or a limited number of private
13. The period in question was January 1, 1978 through June 30, 1978.
14. The four offense categories were homicide, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-451 to -456 (re-
pealed by Ariz. Laws 1977, ch. 142 § 63, effective October 1, 1978); rape, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-611 (repealed by Ariz. Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 63, effective October 1, 1978); aggravated assault,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-245, -249 (repealed by Ariz. Laws 1977, Ch. 142, § 61, effective
October 1, 1978); and exhibiting a deadly weapon in a threatening manner, ARiz. R V. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-916 (repealed by Ariz. Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 61, effective October 1, 1978). The Arizona
Criminal Code was revised in its entirety by the Arizona legislature in 1977, with the new code
becoming effective on October 1, 1978. All of the cases included in the study were prosecuted under
the old code. No differences between the two codes were relevant to the study.
Each of these offenses is a felony under Arizona's criminal code. Felony prosecutions were selected
because serious cases provide special incentives for the defense lawyer to test the credibility of key
prosecution witnesses.
15. Victim surveys indicate that victims of serious violent offenses are far more likely than the
general public to be non-white, unemployed, single, and school dropouts. See Singer, Homogeneous
Victim-Offender Populations: A Review and Some Research Implications, 72 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 779, 779-81 (1981); see also Dodge, Lentzner & Shenk, Crime in the United States: A
Report on the National Crime Survey, in SAMPLE SURVEYS OF THE VICrIMS OF CRIME 5, 6, 17, 19
(W. Skogan ed. 1976).
A significant percentage of victims of violent offenses participating in self-reporting surveys have
indicated that they have been members of gangs, have used knives and guns, and have committed
serious assaults themselves. Singer, supra, at 781-82.
16. Wolfgang reported in a study of criminal homicide cases in Philadelphia over a five-year
period that 47% of the homicide victims had previous arrest records, and that among the victims with
a record, "over half [had] a record of one or more offenses against the person, and over a third [had] a
record'of aggravated assault." M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMIcDE 180 (1958). The
New York City Police Department recently reported that 53.3% of all homicide victims, 12% of all
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lawyers represent a substantial proportion of the indigent persons charged
with crimes. Indeed, some defender agencies represent as many as two-
thirds of all defendants in the courts they serve. 7 It is not unusual for a
single public defender office to represent tens of thousands of defendants
each year."8 The emergence of such large institutional defense offices,
combined with the circumstance that prosecution witnesses frequently are
former offenders themselves, suggests that many prosecution witnesses are
former or current clients of defense counsel. This circumstance, if demon-
strated to be true, may cause conflict of interest problems whenever de-
fense counsel must challenge the witness's credibility or character.
C. Results of the Study
The data, based on a sample of 192 cases, revealed a striking difference
between the extents to which the Public Defender Office opposed current
and former clients.1" As Table One indicates, only 9 of 319 prosecution
witnesses, or 2.8%, were clients of the Public Defender at the time of the
defendant's arraignment in the trial court. By contrast, 43 witnesses, or
13.5% of the witnesses in the cases under observation, were former clients
of the Public Defender.
drug offense victims, 10.9% of all robbery victims, and 10.4% of all assault victims had prior arrests.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1977, at 34, col. 1; see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 36, 76 (1966) (38% of homicide victims and 20% of aggra-
vated assault victims had arrest records); Amir, Victim Precipitated Forcible Rape, 58 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 493, 499 (1967); Pittman and Handy, Patterns in Criminal Aggra-
vated Assault, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SmI. 462, 468 (1964) (121 of 252 victims of
aggravated assault had prior arrest records).
17. An eample is the Alameda County Public Defender, which serves Oakland, California and
neighboring cities. In 1982, this office handled between 60% and 65% of the total criminal cases in
each of the cities it served. Letter from Dean Beaupre, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Alameda
County Public Defender, to Gary Lowenthal (Mar. 1, 1983) (on file with author). In the same year,
the New York Legal Aid Society represented 70% of the criminal defendants in the New York court
system. Letter from Harold S. Jacobson, Special Assistant for Planning and Management, Criminal
Defense Division, The Legal Aid Society of New York, to Gary Lowenthal (Feb. 28, 1983) (on file
with author).
18. In 1982, the Alameda County Public Defender represented 47,785 clients. Letter from Dean
Beaupre, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Alameda County Public Defender, to Gary Lowenthal
(Mar. 1, 1983) (on file with author). In the same year, the New York Legal Aid Society represented
161,708 criminal clients. Letter from Harold S. Jacobson, Special Assistant for Planning and Man-
agement, Criminal Defense Division, The Legal Aid Society of New York, to Gary Lowenthal (Feb.
28, 1983) (on file with author).
19. In comparing prosecution witness lists with the Public Defender's client records, the date of
the defendant's arraignment in the Superior Court (the court of general jurisdiction) was used as a




FREQUENCY OF REPRESENTATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
Current Clients Former Clients No Connection Total
of Defense Counsel of Defense Counsel with Defense
Counsel
Number of
Prosecution 9 43 267 319
Witnesses
Percentage of
Prosecution 2.8 13.5 83.7 100
Witnesses
This discrepancy reflects the conflict-of-interest policy of the Maricopa
County Public Defender Office.20 Like many defender agencies, the Mari-
copa County Public Defender makes a distinction between current and
former clients testifying for the prosecution.2" The Public Defender Office
normally requests permission of the court to withdraw from representing
a new defendant if a prospective prosecution witness is a current client of
the office. As a result, counsel rarely cross-examines current clients. When
a prospective witness is a former client, however, the Public Defender
Office normally moves to withdraw 'from the case only if it becomes ap-
parent that cross-examination would involve the disclosure of confidential
information."2
The percentage of victims who were former public defender clients, as
shown in Table Two, varied from 6% in rape cases to 19% in homicide
and exhibiting firearms cases.23 Altogether, 14% of the victims in the
20. The distinction is reflected in the bar's ethical rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(B) (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a)
(1983).
21. Interview with Bedford Douglass, Assistant Public Defender of Maricopa County (Apr. 28,
1977) (notes on file with author).
22. Homicide cases present an interesting issue, since the victim cannot testify against the defen-
dant. Arguably, this circumstance gives counsel more leeway to use information from the former cli-
ent's file for the benefit of the defendant. The victim can no longer be embarrassed by the informa-
tion, which could conceivably be useful for the fact-finder on the issue of the defendant's guilt.
However, the lawyer is violating the trust placed in him by the deceased client, and the victim's
reputation could be harmed by the breach of trust. On balance, the death of the former client should
not affect the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and secrets.
23. Some qualifications should be noted concerning these data. The reported percentages represent
those cases, and only those cases, in which the Public Defender Office was counsel of record at the
time of the defendant's arraignment in the Superior Court. The percentages overstate the frequency
with which the Public Defender actually cross-examined former clients at trial, because many prose-
cutions were terminated by plea agreement or dismissal before trial. During the year in which the
study took place, 18% of the Public Defender's felony clients pleaded guilty to their original charges,
31% pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges, and 27% pleaded guilty to fewer or lesser felony offenses
thafi those originally charged. MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, ANNUAL REPORT 1978-79,
at 2.
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TABLE TWO
VICTIM & WITNESS CHARACTERISTICS BY OFFENSE
Homicide Rape Felonious Exhibiting All
Assault Firearm Categories
Number
ofCaer 21 31 104 36 192of Cases
Number
of 21 31 112 43 207
Victims
Number of




o 19 6 13 19 14Who Were
Former Clients
Number of
Other Civilian 7 13 75 17 112
Witnesses
Number of












Civilian Witnesses 21 9 13 15 13
Who Were
Former Clients
Table One understates the extent to which the Public Defender Office confronted former clients in
important pre-arraignment proceedings. Some cases are terminated by plea agreement or dismissal at
the preliminary hearing stage and therefore do not proceed to an arraignment. Many plea agreements
at the preliminary hearing stage result in reductions of charges to misdemeanor status. Interview with
Bedford Douglass, Assistant Public Defender of Maricopa County (Apr. 28, 1977). If the victim has
an arrest record, prosecutors are more likely to drop or reduce charges. See Williams, The Effects of
Victim Characteristics on the Disposition of Violent Crimes, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM
177, 181, 192 (W. McDonald ed. 1976).
Finally, the Public Defender Office sometimes withdrew from representing defendants upon discov-
ering conflicts of interest impairing cross-examination at the preliminary hearing stage. Superior
Court arraignment records in those cases would indicate a court-appointed private attorney as counsel
for the defendant, even though the case was originally assigned to the public defender.
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study were former clients of defense counsel. The percentages for non-
victim prosecution witnesses were similar; 13% of these witnesses were
former public defender clients. These figures demonstrate that the public
defender office faced its own former clients as prospective prosecution wit-
nesses in a substantial proportion of its cases. Although the experience of
one defender agency cannot be regarded as representative of criminal law-
yers in general, the office appears to be a typical urban defender agency
handling a large number of cases.2 If as many as 13.5% of the victims
and other prospective government witnesses in prosecutions for violent
felonies are former clients of defense counsel, there is a substantial risk
that conflicts of interest occur frequently.
II. THE ACTUAL PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
WHEN FORMER CLIENTS TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION: A SURVEY
To evaluate the gravity of the risk of conflict of interest from successive
representation, it is important to know the customs of defense counsel
when the situation arises. Some practices may be followed to protect the
current client's right to effective representation. For example, requesting
the witness to consent to counsel's use of information obtained during the
earlier representation focuses on the defendant's interest in a thorough
cross-examination.25 Other approaches, such as office policies that restrict
access to the files of former clients, consider the witness's interest first.
Indeed, an examination of public defender policies relating to the use of
information in former clients' files demonstrates the confusion lawyers ex-
perience in successive representation situations.
The author conducted a survey of public defender agencies covering,
among other issues, successive representation.28 Respondents were asked
how long they retained the files of former clients, whether those files were
24. The Maricopa County Public Defender Office serves Phoenix and surrounding cities. At the
time of the study, Phoenix was the thirteenth most populous city in the United States. U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 25 (1981). During
the 1981-82 fiscal year, the Maricopa County Public Defender employed 72 lawyers and handled
64% of all felony cases filed in the county. Letter from Bedford Douglass, Assistant Public Defender
of Maricopa County, to Gary Lowenthal (May 10, 1983) (on file with author). Cf supra note 17
(percentage of cases handled by Alameda County Public Defender Office and Legal Aid Society of
New York); infra note 27 (number of lawyers employed by public defender agencies participating in
survey).
25. See infra pp. 49-51.
26. This survey, which took place in 1977, included questions about conflicts between former
clients and current clients, situations in which prosecution witnesses are current clients of defense
counsel, joint representation of co-defendants, policies regarding reporting conflicts of interest to the
court, and criminal appeals raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. An earlier article
prepared by the author discussed the joint representation issues included in the survey. Lowenthal,
supra note 9, at 950-58.
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physically accessible to trial attorneys employed by their offices, whether
respondents had rules restricting such access, and whether they had rules
delineating the information in the files that could be used for purposes of
cross-examination. Sixty-three defender offices, ranging in size from three
to over seven hundred lawyers,27 responded to the questionnaire, and per-
sonal interviews were conducted with over twenty individual public de-
fenders in seven cities during a nineteen-month period.
A. The Physical Accessibility of Former Clients' Files
The office files of former clients normally must be retained by original
defense counsel for a variety of reasons.28 If those files are maintained in a
readily accessible location, the confidences or secrets of a former client
may potentially be used in a manner that is disadvantageous to the former
client. This risk is particularly acute if the caseloads of staff attorneys are
large, and resources for pre-trial investigations are scant.29 When investi-
gators are not available to interview witnesses and little time exists for
investigation by staff lawyers themselves, the temptation is strong to walk
across an office to look through a file that may contain a wealth of infor-
mation for cross-examination. This temptation can be even stronger, as
one survey respondent noted, when pre-trial discovery from the govern-
ment is limited.30
The survey revealed that in most offices, former clients' files were read-
ily available to staff attorneys. As shown in Table Three, the files of for-
mer defender clients were retained indefinitely by 77% of the offices re-
sponding to the survey, and were retained for at least 5 years by 93% of
the respondents.3 ' In addition, all sixty defender agencies reporting that
27. The Legal Aid Society of New York, with a staff of 710 lawyers as of September 1977, was
the largest agency to respond to the survey. Other responding offices with over 100 lawyers included
the Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of the Public Defender (430 lawyers), the Los Angeles
County Public Defender Office (388 lawyers), the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender (225
lawyers), and the Maryland Office of the Public Defender (115 lawyers). Ten other offices with over
30 staff lawyers also responded to the survey. Twenty-five responding agencies employed fewer than
ten lawyers.
28. See supra note 7.
29. On the subject of the limited resources available to public defenders for fact investigation, see
S. KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES: THE MANDATE OF Argersinger v. Hanlin 17-18, 182-83 (1976). See also Ligda, Work
Overload and Defender Burnout, 35 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 5 (1977) (effects of working environ-
ment on public defender performance).
30. Questionnaire response of Office of Public Defender, Essex Region, Newark, N.J. (1977) (on
file with author) ("We have great difficulty obtaining discovery from the prosecutor's office. There-
fore we use [former clients'] files for background on witnesses and for leads for investigation. We use
our own [prior] work product or prior discovery."). The difficulties of obtaining pre-trial discovery
from the government are discussed supra note 5 and iinfra pp. 43-44.
31. Table Three represents the responses to the following question: "How long do you keep the
files of former clients after judicial proceedings have been concluded in their case?" A few respondents
noted that they retain misdemeanor files for shorter periods than felony files; the period indicated for
felony files was used in Table Three.
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they retained former clients' files indicated that those files were main-
tained in locations that were physically accessible to their office staff. 2
TABLE THREE
PERIOD IN WHICH CLIENT FILES ARE RETAINED
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Time File Retained Number of Offices Percentage of Offices
Indefinite period 47 77
More than 10 years 2 3
10 years 3 5
5 years 5 8
Less than 5 years 3 5
Do not retain file 1 2
Total 61 100
B. Policies Restricting Access to Files
The supervisors in some public defender agencies expressed concern
over the ready availability of former clients' files. Although there was a
consensus among persons interviewed that staff attorneys generally exer-
cise sound judgment when reviewing the files of former clients, there also
was a shared recognition that strong incentives tempt a lawyer to overlook
a former client's confidentiality rights. First, a public defender's "won-lost
record" may be the most important determinant of his professional status
among peers. Second, in most cases the staff lawyer is not personally ac-
quainted with the former client, and it is easier to identify with the inter-
ests of the current defendant. Finally, the lawyer may perceive the witness
more as a member of the prosecution team than as a former client.
As a result, there is widespread suspicion among public defenders that
some staff attorneys misuse confidential information, although the extent
of the practice is unknown. One Chief Deputy stated this suspicion, only
partially in jest, during an interview: "I don't know how often attorneys
in our office look through old files for cross-examination leads, but we
sure see a lot of lawyers on our felony trial staff spending time hanging
around the file cabinets.""3 Another administrator, expressing similar con-
32. The questionnaire asked: "Are the files of former clients physically accessible to trial attorneys
in your office?" No one responded that the files were inaccessible. However, the Public Defender of
the State of Maryland reported that former client files were accessible only "under written request for
access setting forth reason."
33. Interview with Bedford Douglass, Assistant Public Defender of Maricopa County (Apr. 18,
1977) (notes on file with author).
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cern, indicated that when former clients were prosecution witnesses in
particularly sensitive cases, he would personally lock the former clients'
files in his desk drawer.3
Many of the agencies responding to the survey had policies restricting
staff attorneys' access to or use of former clients' files. However, there was
little uniformity in these rules, and some offices had no policies at all to
cover successive representation problems. Table Four summarizes the ap-
proaches taken by survey respondents in restricting the use of former cli-
ents' files.3 5
TABLE FOUR
PUBLIC DEFENDER POLICIES ON USE OF FORMER




Will not represent defendant 13 2 1t
No access permitted to former client's files 9 15
Access and use with permission of supervisor 2 3
Access only by lawyer who represented former
client 2 3
Access and use permitted to all trial lawyers 36 58 58
Total 62 100 100
As seen in Table Four, thirteen offices, or 21% of the respondents, re-
ported that they automatically sought permission of the court to withdraw
from representing the current client whenever they were called upon to
cross-examine a former client. This prophylactic approach not only elimi-
nates the risk that confidential information will be misused, but also
avoids even the appearance of impropriety occasioned by successive repre-
sentation. 6 Most defender agencies, however, have not adopted the pro-
34. Interview with James C. Hooley, then Public Defender of Alameda County, California (Dec.
14, 1976) (notes on file with author).
35. Respondents were asked: "Does your defender organization have any rules regarding the cir-
cumstances in which attorneys handling the cases of current clients may or may not review the files of
former clients to obtain investigation leads or information useful for cross-examination of the former
client? If so, please explain."
36. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981) ("A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.").
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phylactic approach because of its cost. Whenever a public defender office
withdraws from representing a client, the court must appoint-and com-
pensate-private counsel. If the public defender were to withdraw auto-
matically each time a former client testified for the government, the public
expense would be substantial."7
An additional nine offices (15% of the respondents) prohibited staff at-
torneys from looking into the files of former clients unless they were act-
ing on behalf of the former clients themselves. This policy places the pub-
lic defender staff attorney in the same situation as any other lawyer who
would have to cross-examine the witness without the benefit of confiden-
tial information. It also eliminates the decision as to which information in
a file is protected. 8
Prohibiting lawyers from reviewing the files of former clients, however,
creates two problems. First, without looking into the file of a former client
who is scheduled to testify for the government, defense counsel may not be
able to determine if it is appropriate to withdraw from the defendant's
case, and as a result may continue to represent the defendant even when a
conflict of interest exists. Second, a prohibition against entering the files of
former clients is difficult to enforce. One staff attorney in an agency with
a prohibition policy commented: "I like to refer to the office rule as the
'no peek' rule. But, you know, everyone peeks anyway, and there's no one
to peek at the peekers."' 9
Altogether, 36% of the survey respondents either automatically with-
drew from successive representation cases or prohibited staff lawyers from
looking into files of former clients. The remaining respondents offered less
protection to their former clients. A few permitted access and use of a
former client's files only by the lawyer who previously represented the
witness40 or only after a supervising attorney had first reviewed the file to
37. Several defenders remarked that the expense to the public precluded their withdrawal from all
cases in which there was a potential conflict with a former client. The survey response of the Trenton
Office of the Public Defender is typical of these defenders: "The safer course might be to avoid all
such conflicts. Unfortunately, after a period of time that would mean staying out of a very large
number of cases. This is impossible." Questionnaire response of the Office of the Public Defender,
Trenton, N.J. (1977) (on file with author). At least one defender was bitter over the constraints
imposed by local budgets on withdrawals for conflicts: "The private bar breaches the professional
codes because they hate to give up a fee, [and] we keep cases to save the state's money. I feel the
situation is a disgrace to the legal profession." Questionnaire response of the Public Defender, New
Haven County, Connecticut (1977) (on file with author). The New Haven defender's comment re-
garding the private bar is beyond the purview of this article; on the issue of economic incentives for
private lawyers to ignore conflicts of interest, see Lowenthal, supra note 9, at 961-63.
38. See infra pp. 16-17.
39. Interview with Howard Harpham, Assistant Public Defender, Alameda County, California
(Dec. 15, 1976) (notes on file with author).
40. Two defender organizations reported that the file of a former client is accessible only to the
individual lawyer who represented that client. One of those organizations, the Office of Public De-
fender of Kentucky, is a "loose confederation" of 430 individual attorneys. The deputy defender pre-
paring the survey response commented that attorneys are likely to protect their own former clients:
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remove confidential information."1 However, thirty-six defender agencies
(58%) reported that staff lawyers in their offices were permitted to look
into former clients' files and to use some or all of the information there for
cross-examination.
C. Restrictions on Using Information Found in Files
The thirty-six defender offices which permitted staff attorneys access to
former clients' files for cross-examination leads followed divergent ap-
proaches in deciding which information in those files could be used. 2 For
instance, seventeen offices distinguished between privileged information
obtained from attorney-client communications and all other information in
the former client's file. This approach preserves the integrity of all com-
munications made by the former client to the attorney, but permits coun-
sel to use information contained in old police reports, probation reports,
and other items. Other defenders objected to this practice, however, be-
cause the police reports and probation reports in question came into the
defenders' possession as a result of the trust reposed in them by former
clients. Using those reports in cross-examination was viewed by many of-
fices as a breach of that trust.48
Twenty-one of the thirty-six offices sought to distinguish "confidential"
from "public" information, allowing attorneys to use only that informa-
tion in the files of former clients that could have been obtained from other
sources.44 This approach permits lawyers to obtain information promptly
"Obviously, an attorney aware of a possible conflict would not permit another attorney to look at his
files." Questionnaire response of the Office of the Public Defenser of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
(1977) (on file with author).
A second agency reported a similar but more formal approach: "Office policy does not allow access
to files of former clients other than by the attorney who represented that client, or by a successor
attorney acting in behalf of former client." Questionnaire response of the Public Defender Service for
the District of Columbia (1977) (on file with author).
41. The offices reporting that they followed this policy were those of Monterey County, Califor-
nia and Franklin County, Ohio.
42. Respondents were asked in the questionnaire:
If attorneys in your organization are permitted to look into the files of former clients, are they
permitted to use information from those files in representing current clients, so long as the
information in question could also have been obtained from other sources? Do you distinguish
between information that was obtained as part of a privileged client-attorney communication
and all other information in the former client's file?
43. The practice of distinguishing between privileged communications and all other information in
a former client's file also may violate DR 4-101 of the Model Code. See Model Code of Professional
Risponsibiliv DR 4-101; infra pp. 20-21.
44. The twenty-one agencies include some of the seventeen public defender offices that indicated
that they distinguish between confidences and other information in a former client's file.
Typical is the policy statement of the Public Defender in Monterey County, California: "A poten-
tial conflict of interest arises when a crime victim or a prosecution witness has in the past been
represented by the office and his case file has useful information of a confidential nature as opposed to
a matter of a public nature." MONTEREY COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER PROCEDURES MANUAL § 315
B.2 (1977). A similar rule was followed by the Maricopa County Public Defender, the office dis-
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when discovery procedures or independent investigation to acquire the
same information would be time-consuming or costly. It also preserves all
private information concerning the former client, not just information that
is protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. However, the
public-private distinction ignores the possibility that counsel might not
even be aware of the existence of much "public" information if it were not
included in the former client's file.45
Nine other offices reported that they did not formally distinguish be-
tween different types of information in a former client's file, but instead
left it to the discretion of the individual staff attorney or a supervising
attorney to determine whether to remain in a case and which information
to use in preparing cross-examination."' This approach recognizes that
the circumstances of each case will determine the strength of the clients'
respective interests. One problem with a case-by-case approach, however,
is that two lawyers in the same office might handle identical situations
differently. Moreover, the judgment of the individual staff attorney may
be colored by the strength of the prosecution's case. There is a natural
tendency among trial lawyers to want to try a "winning case" and to
avoid taking a "loser" to trial. If the questionable information in a former
client's file has a bearing on the former client's credibility as a witness
and the defendant has a strong chance for acquittal, the incentive is strong
for the individual trial lawyer to minimize the seriousness of the potential
conflict. Conversely, in a case in which the defendant's chance for an ac-
quittal is virtually non-existent but the defendant desires to proceed to
trial, counsel may be particularly alert to even a remote possibility of con-
flicting interest which would enable him to withdraw from the case."'
cussed in the study reported supra pp. 7-11. Interview with Bedford Douglass, Assistant Public De-
fender of Maricopa County (Apr. 28, 1977) (notes on file with author).
45. Several defenders commented that the public-private distinction, like the distinction between
privileged communications and all other information in a file, violated the former client's trust. Much
of the problem stems from lawyers' disagreement on what is "public" information. Some respondents
in the survey would permit the use of information in a former client's file if that information could
have been obtained from a "public" record, even though it is extremely unlikely that the lawyer
would have uncovered the information in the absence of the prior representation. Other offices re-
ported that they distinguished between information that was generally known or easily obtainable
from other sources and information that was .contained in less accessible "public" records.
46. The following statement was typical for offices in this category: "The attorney assigned the
case of the current client makes his own conflict determination. Supervisors review the decision, but
rarely overrule." Questionnaire response of the Sacramento County Public Defender (1977) (empha-
sis in original) (on file with author).
47. This phenomenon was noted by several defenders who were interviewed by the author, partic-
ularly Patrick Murphy, Public Defender for Contra Costa County, Cal. Interview with Patrick Mur-
phy, Public Defender for Costa County, Cal. (Dec. 15, 1976) (notes on file with author).
In addition, one public defender office defined its loyalty almost exclusively in terms of its current
client:
As long as the former client's case has been disposed of, and as long as the new information
would not incriminate him or her in any new crimes, I see no reason why information from
The Yale Law Journal
In general, the survey responses demonstrate that public defenders fol-
low a remarkable variety of practices when former clients are called as
prosecution witnesses. Defenders disagree about the circumstances in
which it is permissible to cross-examine a former client, and also disagree
about which information in a former client's file may be used to prepare
cross-examination. This disagreement reflects the uncertain guidance pro-
vided by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which completely
ignores the problems of successive representation. The following Section
compares the Model Code with the proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, and suggests a framework for providing more direction to crimi-
nal practitioners.
III. SUCCESSIVE REPRESENTATION AND THE BAR'S ETHICAL RULES
A. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The successive representation of clients with potentially conflicting in-
terests is not treated explicitly by the Model Code. The Model Code pro-
vides no guidance to attorneys concerning the propriety of representing a
client when a former client is either an adverse party or witness.4" Canon
5, which purports to deal with recurring conflict of interest problems, fo-
cuses on such matters as the simultaneous representation of adverse inter-
ests, 49 conflict between a lawyer's own economic or personal interests and
those of a client,50 circumstances in which a lawyer may be called as a
witness in a client's case,51 and problems that may result when a person
other than a client compensates counsel.52 None of the Ethical Considera-
tions or Disciplinary Rules associated with Canon 5 refer even indirectly
to successive representation.5 3
his file should not be used ... for a second client at a later time. .... Information relevant to
impeachment of the former client acting as a State's witness can be most helpful.
Questionnaire response of the Racine County, Wis., Public Defender Office (1977). Although this
policy appears to be insensitive to the confidentiality interest of a former client, it goes further than all
other office policies in assuring that the defendant receives competent and zealous representation.
However, the survey data indicate that this approach is viewed by many defenders as unacceptable
because it violates the trust that former clients have reposed in their counsel.
48. DR 5-105(A) and (B) require lawyers to decline or discontinue the representation of a client
if counsel's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client is likely to be adversely affected
by the representation of another client. Although these provisions can be interpreted to apply to suc-
cessive representation, a close reading of the two provisions clearly shows that they were intended to
refer to the sirultaneous representation of potentially conflicting interests. MODE.L CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A), DR 5-105(B) (1981).
49. See id. DR 5-105, DR 5-106, EC 5-14, EC 5-15, EC 5-16, EC 5-17, EC 5-19.
50. See id. DR 5-101(A), DR 5-103, DR 5-104, EC 5-2, EC 5-3, EC 5-4, EC 5-5, EC 5-6, EC
5-7, EC 5-8, EC 5-11, EC 5-13.
51. See id. DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102, EC 5-9, EC 5-10.
52. See id. DR 5-107, EC 5-22, EC 5-23.
53. The closest Canon 5 comes to discussing successive representation is EC 5-20, which addresses
the question of a lawyer serving as an arbitrator or a mediator in a matter which involves either
present or former clients. Id. EC 5-20.
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Instead, when a lawyer represents a party in litigation and a former
client is either an adverse party or a witness in the same case, separate
provisions of the Model Code explain the duties owed to each client. Ca-
nons 6 and 7 exhort the lawyer to represent the current client competently
and zealously, 4 while Canon 4 defines counsel's continuing duty to pre-
serve the confidential information of the former client.55 The relationship
between Canon 4 and Canons 6 and 7 is ambiguous, and none of the
Ethical Considerations or Disciplinary Rules associated with any of these
Canons refer to the competing duties owed to former and present clients.
1. Duties Owed to the Current Client
The ethical obligation to represent a client competently includes a duty
to conduct factual investigations in preparing a client's case.56 Although
DR 6-101(A)(2) of the Model Code states this duty in such vague and
general terms that its scope is impossible to discern,57 the ABA Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Defense Func-
tion includes a more precise statement of the criminal lawyer's investiga-
tory obligation, with a requirement that counsel's "prompt" investigation
should "explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt . . or pen-
alty."58 Taken literally, this duty would require counsel to review the of-
fice files of a former client testifying for the prosecution, to uncover leads
for cross-examination.
The investigatory duty owed to the current client is buttressed by Ca-
non 7's vague exhortation to represent a client "Zealously Within the
Bounds of the Law."' 59 The drafters of the Model Code intentionally left
54. "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1981). "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds
of the Law." Id. Canon 7.
55. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." Id. Canon 4.
56. Id. DR 6-101(A)(2), EC 6-4.
57. DR 6-101(A)(2) states that a lawyer shall not "[hiandle a legal matter without preparation
adequate in the circumstances." Id. DR 6-101(A)(2).
58. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at Standard 4.1. The Commentary to Standard 4.1 includes
the following:
The relationship of effective investigation by the lawyer to competent representation at trial is
patent, for without adequate investigation he is not in a position to make the best use of such
mechanisms as cross-examination or impeachment of adverse witnesses at trial or to conduct
plea discussions effectively. He needs to know as much as possible about the character and
background of witnesses to take advantage of impeachment ....
Id. Commentary to 4.1 (emphasis added).
59. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981). The meaning of "zeal-
ous" representation is clarified for criminal lawyers by the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense
Function. According to the ABA Standards, the "primary role" of criminal defense counsel, more so
than for other lawyers, is to serve as the client's "champion." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at
145-46 introduction. Because of the unique disadvantages of the criminal defendant in the adversary
system, the ABA Standards admonish criminal lawyers that they "cannot be timorous" in protecting
the rights of an accused. Id. at 146 introduction.
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the scope of this duty vague because "[t]he bounds of the law in a given
case are often difficult to ascertain."60 Therefore, one provision in DR 7-
101 permits counsel to "exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail
to assert a right or position of his client,"6" even though another portion of
the same Disciplinary Rule requires counsel to "seek the lawful objectives
of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the
Disciplinary Rules ... -*" The application of these arguably contradic-
tory provisions to the cross-examination of former clients is anything but
clear. Nevertheless, when considered with the criminal lawyer's investiga-
tory obligation, the duty of zealous representation on behalf of a criminal
defendant can be read by the practitioner as a broad mandate to uncover
defense evidence aggressively, putting the defendant's interests ahead of
those of a former client.
2. Duties Owed to the Former Client
On .the surface, the duties owed to the former client under the Model
Code seem clear. DR 4-101 protects not only a client's confidences, but
also his "secrets," or "other information gained in the professional rela-
tionship. . . the disclosure of which would. . . be likely to be detrimen-
tal to the client."6 The duty to preserve secrets exists "without regard to
the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the
knowledge."6" Therefore, it presumably includes such matters as police
reports, arrest records, psychiatric information, and probation reports."5
Since the duty to preserve a client's confidential information "continues
after the termination" of a formal lawyer-client relationship, 6 application
of Canon 4 to the information contained in the file of a criminal lawyer's
former client appears dear. Defender offices that distinguish between a
former client's confidential communications and other information in the
client's file may thus be violating the Model Code.
There is, however, a qualification to Canon 4's confidentiality require-
ment. DR 4-101(C)(2) permits the disclosure of a client's confidences or
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-2 (1981).
61. Id. DR 7-101(B)(t).
62. Id. DR 7-101(A)(1).
63. Id. DR 4-101(A).
64. Id. EC 4-4 (covering any information "acquired in the course of the representation").
65. Cf id. EC 4-5 (condemning use of such information to client's disadvantage).
66. Id. EC 4-6.
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secrets "when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or
court order." ' Whether this may fairly be read to include the Discipli-
nary Rules associated with Canons 6 and 7, the ABA's Standards Relat-
ing to the Defense Function, and the Sixth Amendment's requirement of
effective assistance of counsel, is unclear."5 The Code's application to suc-
cessive representation in criminal cases is confusing; it is not surprising
that public defenders take diverse approaches when former clients testify
for the government.
B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Code has failed both to determine when it is inappropriate
to oppose a former client in litigation, and to indicate which information,
if any, in a former client's file may be used to further the representation
of a current client. Each of these shortcomings is addressed explicitly in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.9(a) prohibits a lawyer
from representing a client against a former client under certain circum-
stances, and Rule 1.9(b) extends Canon 4's protection of a client's confi-
dential information to the specific circumstances of successive representa-
tion." Together, these provisions address several of the problems that
have plagued practitioners under the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.9(a) prohibits successive representation if the current client's in-
terests are "materially adverse" to the interests of the former client and
the two matters of client representation are the same or are "substantially
related."170 This rule is essentially a restatement of the standard followed
by most courts when one party in a civil action moves to disqualify its
former counsel from representing an adverse party.7 1 Adoption of the civil
litigation disqualification rule for criminal representation is a laudable ad-
dition to the bar's official ethical standards. Since the rule does not re-
quire withdrawal from a case every time a former client is a prosecution
witness, it would not result in unnecessary public expense for indigent
defense representation. The rule might also lessen criminal lawyers' use of
67. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2).
68. A similar ambiguity occurs in Canon 7. DR 7-101(A), defining a lawyer's responsibility to
represent a client zealously, states that a lawyer shall not intentionally "[flail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary
Rules . . . ... Id. DR 7-101(A). It is not clear whether use of a former client's closed.file for investi-
gation leads is a "means permitted by . . . the Disciplinary Rules," when this provision is compared
with DR 4-101(B)(2).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983).
70. The text of Rule 1.9(a) states that a lawyer shall not "represent another person in the same or
a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of
the former client unless the former client consents after consultation." Id. Rule 1.9(a).
71. The disqualification rule followed in civil litigation is discussed at length infra pp. 28-31.
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former clients' confidential information against those clients in cross-ex-
amination; arguably, when a former client's file contains information use-
ful for cross-examination, the former client's case is "substantially re-
lated" to the defendant's case.
However, two problems in the present wording of Rule 1.9(a) could
limit its applicability in criminal cases or confuse lawyers trying to follow
it. First, the rule applies only when the respective interests of the former
and current clients are "materially adverse." In civil litigation, the courts
have used the adversity requirement to deny disqualification when the
movant is a co-plaintiff or co-defendant.7 2 It is by no means clear from
proposed Rule 1.9(a) whether the interests of a witness, rather than an
opposing party, are sufficiently adverse to those of a criminal defendant to
invoke the prohibition." This ambiguity should be eliminated to protect a
witness's interest in criminal cases.
Second, the Model Rules provide no guidance in determining if two
matters of client representation are "substantially related." The drafters'
reluctance to define this term is understandable, since the courts have
failed.to agree on a definition for over thirty years.74 Nevertheless, a pro-
hibition against unethical conduct should specify that conduct in unequiv-
ocal terms. A former client's case that was based in part on the same
events or transactions as the defendant's case would appear to be "sub-
stantially related."'75 In other circumstances, however, the extent and im-
portance of the relationship are less clear. Some guidance on these ques-
tions, at least in the Official Comment to Rule 1.9(a), would be
invaluable .7
Rule 1.9(b) resolves the conflicting obligations under Canons 4, 6, and
7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in favor of the former
client's confidentiality interest. It states that a lawyer may not ordinarily
use information "relating to" the representation of a former client to the
"disadvantage" of the former client.77 The broad inclusion of all informa-
72. For an analysis of the adversity requirement, see Developments in the Law-Conflicts of In-
terest in the Legal Profession, 94 HAM. L. REV. 1244, 1323-25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
73. The Comment to Rule 1.9 refers to Rule 1.7 to determine whether the interests of the present
and former clients are adverse. Although Rule 1.7 itself does not address this issue, the Comment to
that rule makes clear that the term "adverse" in the context of litigation refers to an opposing party.
Nothing in Rules 1.7 or 1.9 indicates whether the interests of a witness are sufficiently adverse to
invoke the prohibition.
74. See infra pp. 30-31.
75. See infra p. 30.
76. See infra pp. 30-31.
77. The text of Rule 1.9(b) states that a lawyer shall not "use information relating to the repre-
sentation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a
client or when the information has become generally known." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcr Rule 1.9(b) (1983).
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tion "relating to" the former client's case protects not only confidential
communications from the former client, but also information contained in
such items as police reports and probation reports. A lawyer's use of a
former client's protected information when cross-examining the former
client is probably to the "disadvantage" of the former client, but any am-
biguity should be eliminated from the proposed rule."'
An explicitly stated exception to Rule 1.9(b) occurs when "the informa-
tion has become generally known."7 9 This exception supports the distinc-
tion made by some public defenders between private information and
other, "generally known" information that could easily be obtained from
other sources. 80 The requirement of general availability protects the for-
mer client from the lawyer's use of information which could have been
obtained from outside sources but which the lawyer could not reasonably
have been expected to discover in the absence of the prior representation.8"
These problems with the wording of the Model Rules can easily be
overcome by minor redrafting. In general, the Model Rules significantly
improve upon the approach of the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, both by recognizing the potential for conflict of interest in successive
representation and by delineating basic rules that address the most sub-
stantial practical problems occurring in criminal cases. But the courts too
must come to grips with the problems of successive representation by
criminal defense lawyers.
IV. THE CASE LAW OF SUCCESSIVE REPRESENTATION
The issue of whether a criminal defense lawyer may oppose a former
client in a particular case has been raised in three procedural contexts: (1)
in post-conviction proceedings when a defendant seeks to overturn his con-
viction on the ground that defense counsel's divided loyalty violated his
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) at trial,
when the defense lawyer moves to withdraw from the case, rather than
cross-examine the former client; and (3) at trial, when the prosecution
seeks to disqualify the defense lawyer in much the same manner that civil
litigants sometimes seek to disqualify their former counsel from represent-
ing adversaries. Since the manner and context in which the issue is raised
78. The same problem exists in the wording of MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(B)(2).
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1983).
80. See supra p. 17.
81. Rule 1.9(b) also permits the use of confidential information against the former client in cir-
cumstances covered by Rule 1.6. The final form of the Model Rules restricts the scope of Rule 1.6 to
circumstances in which the lawyer's disclosure of confidential information will either prevent the com-
mission of a serious violent crime, or establish a claim or defense on the lawyer's own part. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983).
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affect its resolution in both trial couits and appellate courts, it is necessary
to analyze each procedural context separately.
A. No Motion to Withdraw or Disqualify is Made in the Trial Court
A criminal defense lawyer represents Tom on a charge of possess-
ing narcotics. Tom enters a guilty plea as part of a negotiated plea
bargain with the government. The prosecution recommends proba-
tion for Tom in return for Tom's cooperation in the apprehension of
other persons engaged in narcotics traffic. Tom is granted probation
by the court and later identifies Mary as a seller of narcotics. Subse-
quently, Mary is charged with distributing narcotics, and Mary re-
tains the lawyer who previously represented Tom. At Mary's trial,
Tom is called as a government witness. No one brings the lawyer's
prior representation of Tom to the attention of the trial court. Mary
is convicted and later seeks to overturn her conviction on the ground
that she has been denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Mary's case presents two issues. First, why should Mary be permitted
to challenge her conviction when she failed to raise the conflict of interest
claim in the trial court? Second, what standard of review should the court
apply on appeal? This section examines the current law associated with
each of these issues and suggests an alternative approach.
1. Current Law
A defendant's timely objection to successive representation is not a pre-
requisite for post-conviction relief.8 2 In the illustration, Mary might not
even learn that Tom was her attorney's former client until after she has
been convicted. Criminal defense counsel may fail to disclose an earlier
representation for several reasons. Sometimes the lawyer has a pecuniary
interest in remaining in the case, and as a result may overlook or ignore a
potential conflict of interest involving a former client."3 In other cases, the
lawyer may simply conclude erroneously that he will not have to cross-
examine the witness on the subject of the prior representation, or that the
82. The contemporaneous objection rule of most jurisdictions requires the defendant under normal
circumstances to afford the trial court a timely opportunity to cure a procedural error before permit-
ting the defendant to raise the issue on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Constant, 645 P.2d 843, 847 (Colo.
1982); State v. Lang, 46 N.C. App. 138, 146-47, 264 S.E.2d 821, 827 (1980); State v. Weygandt, 20
Wash. App. 599, 605, 581 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1978). In addition, federal habeas corpus review usually
is not available to a defendant who defaults in raising a constitutional issue in the state courts. See
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82-83 (1977). These rules have never been invoked by the courts
in successive representation cases.
83. See Lowenthal, supra note 9, at 961-63 (1978) (economic pressures on privately retained
lawyers causing them to overlook conflict of interests).
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problem can be overcome by adequate representation of the defendant in
all other respects."'
Even when a defendant in Mary's circumstances is aware before trial of
the prior representation, she may not appreciate the risk that a conflict of
interest will occur. Unless advised by counsel, the current client probably
will not realize that the lawyer may avoid certain issues when cross-exam-
ining the witness. The defendant also may hesitate to object to the law-
yer's continued participation in the case because of the formidable expense
and anxiety associated with obtaining new counsel.8 5 Accordingly, the
courts have not applied a contemporaneous objection rule in successive
representation cases.8 6 Although a few decisions have cited the defendant's
failure to object as one of several reasons for not reversing, in each case
there was evidence that the defendant was aware of the prior representa-
tion when he retained counsel and in fact sought to obtain an advantage
by retaining a lawyer familiar with a key prosecution witness.,
Even though there are sound justifications for permitting a defendant to
raise the conflict of interest issue for the first time in post-conviction pro-
ceedings, this exception to the contemporaneous objection rule creates sub-
stantial problems for reviewing courts. First, since the issue can be pre-
served without being brought to the attention of the trial court, there is a
risk that an imaginative defendant-or defense counsel-can manipulate
the situation to create a basis for appeal. A defendant might retain a par-
ticular lawyer, or choose to continue to be represented by a lawyer, specif-
84. See United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973).
The Alberli case is discussed extensively infra pp. 31-34.
85. Since criminal defense lawyers normally require all or most of their fees to be paid in ad-
vance, the initial outlay for new counsel would be a burden for many defendants. The discharged
lawyer would retain a portion (and in some cases a substantial portion) of the fee already paid, as
compensation for time already spent on the case. The new lawyer would have to familiarize himself
with the case and repeat much of the pre-trial preparation already completed by the first defense
counsel. This "double fee" would probably be absorbed by the defendant in most cases. Even when
the defendant is indigent, obtaining new court-appointed counsel involves terminating one professional
relationship and having to develop trust and rapport in the new relationship. I make the assumption
in the text that such a transition includes "psychological costs" for many criminal defendants. For a
discussion of related problems, see Lowenthal, supra note 9, at 958-61.
86. The Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. However, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980), a joint representation case in which the defendant raised no conflict-of-interest objection in the
trial court, the Court held that a criminal defendant would be entitled to a new trial if he could
demonstrate to a reviewing court that a conflict had impaired the performance of his trial lawyer.
87. See United States v. James, 505 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1975); Olshen v. McMann, 378 F.2d
993, 994 (2d Cir. 1967); Taylor v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 764, 765 (D. D.C. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Commonwealth v. Biancone, 260 Pa. Super. 197, 200,
393 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1978). In People v. Hallett, 71 A.D.2d 815, 817, 419 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400
(1979), the trial judge asked the defense if there was a conflict of interest. The defendant remained
silent, but counsel stated that his client "waived" any conflict. Over a strongly worded dissent, the
appellate court upheld the "waiver." For a discussion of what constitutes a valid waiver of effective
representation, see infra pp. 58-61. In view of a recent Second Circuit case on this issue, see United
States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982), it is doubtful that Hallelt is good law.
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ically because the lawyer previously represented a government witness in
the defendant's case."8 The defendant can then attack his conviction on the
ground that counsel's obligation to preserve the witness's confidences de-
nied him the effective assistance of counsel. Similarly, a lawyer might fail
to disclose to the trial court his prior representation of a prosecution wit-
ness in order to give the defendant an opportunity for a second trial at
little cost.89
Second, it is extremely difficult in post-conviction proceedings to ascer-
tain whether a conflict in the obligations of defense counsel actually im-
paired a lawyer's representation. A former professional relationship may
have no bearing on the conduct of cross-examination." Moreover, when a
conflict of interest does exist, the lawyer may decide to forego protection of
the witness's interest and vigorously cross-examine the witness, even
though such cross-examination may involve the disclosure of confidential
information.91
For all these reasons, appellate courts consistently have required the
defendant to shoulder a heavy burden in post-conviction proceedings to
obtain, a new trial when the alleged conflict was not brought to the atten-
tion of the original trial court. Before the Supreme Court's 1980 decision
in Cuyler v. Sullivan,92 most courts formulated this burden by requiring
the defendant to demonstrate "some specific instance of prejudice, some
real conflict of interest"9 actually inhibiting counsel's cross-examination.
This test required both specification of the protected confidential informa-
tion and a showing of prejudice.94 Cuyler, however, has modified the test.
Cuyler involved the joint representation of co-defendants by privately
88. See Taylor v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 764, 765 (D.D.C. 1954), revzd on other grounds,
226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
89. In an analogous context, involving a failure by defense counsel to move for the suppression of
evidence before trial, Justice Rehnquist reasoned: "Strong tactical considerations [by defense counsel]
would militate in favor of delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought
that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction
at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult." Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241
(1973).
90. When defense counsel's prior representation of a prosecution witness concerned a matter to-
tally unrelated to the defendant's case, the courts routinely find that no debilitating conflict of interest
existed. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 645 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1981); Bynum v. United States,
422 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); People v. Frisbie, 70 A.D.2d 1053, 1054, 417 N.Y.S.2d
551, 552 (1979).
91. Reviewing courts sometimes remark that the defendant actually benefited from counsel's fa-
miliarity with a prosecution witness he formerly represented. See Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d
614, 615 (5th Cir. 1968).
92. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
93. United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir. 1970). As late as 1979, courts still
required a showing of prejudice as a requisite for reversing the defendant's conviction. See Crisp v.
State, 394 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1979).
94. See Olshen v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1967) (articulating the rationale for the defen-
dant's required showing).
Vol. 93: 1, 1983
Successive Criminal Representation
retained counsel. 5 The trial judge neither admonished the defendants of
the risks of joint representation nor assessed the possibility that a conflict
of interest would develop. Neither the defendants nor their counsel ob-
jected to the joint representation in the trial court. The Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation applied
equally to privately retained and state appointed counsel,96 but that the
Constitution did not require the court to initiate inquiries into the propri-
ety of joint representation.97 In addition, the Court concluded that when
the defense fails to object to a possible conflict of interest in the trial court,
the convicted defendant seeking a new trial must demonstrate "that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 8 If
such a showing is made, however, the defendant "need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief." 9
Although Cuyler involved joint representation, lower courts have ap-
plied its holdings in successive representation cases. °00 These courts have
interpreted Cuyler to require the defendant to demonstrate that trial coun-
sel chose to protect the witness by avoiding specific issues on cross-exami-
nation, and that questioning the witness on those issues would have been
favorable to the defendant's case, regardless of whether the additional
questioning would have affected the outcome of the trial.101
Even without a more rigorous prejudice requirement, this showing is
not easily or often made. Justice Marshall commented in his separate
opinion in Cuyler that requiring a defendant "to demonstrate that his at-
torney's trial performance differed from what it would have been if the
defendant had been the attorney's only client . . . is not only unduly
harsh, but incurably speculative as well." 0 2 The convicted defendant may
95. Two defense lawyers represented three defendants in separate murder trials in Cuyler. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that this did not constitute multiple representation. Common-
wealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 161, 371 A.2d 468, 483 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit disagreed, holding as a matter of law that defense counsel engaged in joint representation.
United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 519 (3d Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court
upheld the Third Circuit on this point. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 342.
96. 446 U.S. at 344-45. Several lower courts previously distinguished between privately retained
counsel and public defenders or court-appointed lawyers for Sixth Amendment purposes. See Olshen
v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993, 995 n.2 (2d. Cir. 1967). See generally Lowenthal, supra note 9, 965-68
(criticizing decisions that distinguished between privately retained and court appointed counsel).
97. 446 U.S. at 346-48.
98. Id. at 348.
99. Id. at 349-50.
100. See United States v. Camiel, 519 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
101. Those courts that previously required the aggrieved defendant to demonstrate prejudice no
longer do so. See Brown v. United States, 665 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1982). Some courts, however,
still require a post-conviction inquiry to determine "whether the appellant's attorney refrained from a
more vigorous cross-examination of the [witness] because of his divided loyalties, and, if so, whether
the appellant's representation would have benefited even marginally from a more aggressive cross-
examination." Id. at 273 (Tang, J., concurring).
102. 446 U. S. at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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not be aware of the areas of cross-examination that the lawyer skirted
because of the prior lawyer-client relationship. Moreover, the attorney
himself, when questioned in a post-conviction hearing, may not fully dis-
close the subtle pressures that might have constrained cross-examination.
The Cuyler approach also necessitates an inquiry into the very confi-
dential information that the attorney has sought to protect. In order to
determine whether the lawyer refrained from certain areas of cross-exami-
nation and whether the defendant would have benefited from a more thor-
ough cross, the reviewing court must have a basic understanding of the
nature of the information that could have been developed by counsel.
Therefore, if the defendant can meet the "unduly harsh" Cuyler burden,
the witness's confidentiality interest may be compromised.
Because of the problems under Cuyler in successive representation
cases, the courts should consider alternative approaches. It would, for ex-
ample, be instructive to contrast the Sixth Amendment decisions with civil
disqualification cases involving former clients. Both lines of decision ex-
amine counsel's use of a former client's confidential information when
representing a current client with differing interests. The two situations
are markedly different in at least one respect: In the civil disqualification
cases the former client seeks prospective relief to prevent the misuse of
confidential information, while in the criminal cases the current client
seeks remedial relief for counsel's failure to use the information in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, counsel's competing professional obligations are the
same in each situation. The lawyer in both cases may be compelled to
choose between divulging secrets of the former client and foregoing zeal-
ous representation of the current client. Despite the similarity, courts have
approached the two kinds of cases quite differently.
2. The Civil Disqualification Standard
The legal standard for disqualification of lawyers in civil cases, cur-
rently followed in virtually all American jurisdictions,10 3 was articulated
in T.C. Theatre Corporation v. Warner Brothers Pictures.10' The "sub-
103. See, e.g., Cossette v. Country Style Donuts, Inc., 647 F.2d 526, 529-36 (5th Cir. 1981);
Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1980); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998
(9th Cir. 1980); National Texture Corp. v. Hymes, 282 N.W.2d 890, 894 (1979); Reardon v.
Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 472, 416 A.2d 852, 858-59 (1980).
Rule 1.9 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT incorporates the "substantial relation-
ship" standard to determine when a lawyer may ethically oppose a former client in litigation. See
supra pp. 21-22.
104. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). After the conclusion of a public antitrust action against
Universal Pictures and several other major distributors of motion pictures, Universal's former lawyer
brought a suit by T.C. Theatre against Universal and the other defendants named in the antitrust
case, alleging the same conspiracy to restrain trade that had been litigated in the earlier action. Uni-
versal moved to disqualify the attorney from representing the plaintiff.
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stantial relationship" test of T.C. Theatre requires three elements: (1)
former representation of a party to the present action;105 (2) present rep-
resentation of a party whose interest is adverse to the former client's inter-
est; °10 and (3) a substantial relationship between the former representa-
tion and any of the issues in the present action.10 7 The party seeking
disqualification need not prove that any actual confidences were reposed
in its former lawyer; the court will "assume" that confidential information
was passed to counsel if there is a "substantial relationship" between the
two cases.10 ' A disqualification ruling, therefore, is not a determination
that a lawyer's actual behavior has jeopardized one client's interests to
benefit another's. Rather, it is a prophylactic standard which seeks to
avoid the lawyer's having to choose between competing obligations, and
which recognizes that one client's interest may subtly color the attorney's
judgment in serving the interest of the other.10°
The civil disqualification rule is based on several considerations related
to the "enormous pragmatic obstacles to any inquiry into the attorney's
actual knowledge and conduct."110 First, it would often be extremely diffi-
cult for the former client to prove that counsel actually received and used
(or was prepared to use) confidential information of value in the current
litigation. 11 Second, disqualifying counsel when the prior representation
is substantially related to the current lawsuiti avoids the appearance of
impropriety, furthering an important policy of the bar's self-regulatory
rules.1 22 Third, as the T.C. Theatre opinion recognized, the introduction
The court granted the motion to protect Universal from the !disclosure or misuse of client confi-
dences entrusted to the lawyer in the earlier case. According to the court, "where any substantial
relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a subse-
quent adverse representation, the latter will be prohibited." Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
105. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods., 605 F.2d 380, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1979); Novo Ter-
apeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1979).
106. For an analysis of the adversity requirement, see Developments, supra note 72, at 1324-25.
107. On the meaning of "substantial relationship," see infra pp. 30-31.
108. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
109. See Developments, supra note 72, at 1318. Judge Weinfeld in T.C. Theatre described the
subtle effects of the competing client interests on the attorney's judgment:
Were [the lawyer] permitted to represent a client whose cause is related and adverse to that of
his former client he would be called upon to decide what is confidential and what is not, and,
perhaps, unintentionally to make use of confidential information received from the former cli-
ent while espousing his cause.
113 F. Supp. at 269.
110. Developments, supra note 72, at 1318.
111. Before T.C. Theatre, courts required the former client to establish that confidential informa-
tion actually revealed to the lawyer in the previous representation was useful to the adverse party in
the present lawsuit. Disqualification motions usually failed, because of the difficulty of proof. See
Note, Disqualification of Attorneys Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J.
917, 919, (1955); ABA COMM. ON ETHics AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY, FORMAL Op. 324,
n.6 (1975).
112. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 9 (1981). One decision lucidly
articulated the applicability of the principles of Canon 9 in this context:
A strict construction of a lawyer's duties in cases like this one would give clients cause to feel
they had been mistreated. If an attorney is permitted to defend a motion to disqualify by
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of evidence to prove actual misconduct by counsel would "require the dis-
closure of the very matters intended to be protected by the rule.'" 3
Whether a "substantial relationship" exists between a prior representa-
tion and a current lawsuit depends on the circumstances of each case. In
certain situations the relationship is "patently clear. 11 14 When both the
current and prior professional relationships are based on the same events
or transactions, the courts readily find that a substantial relationship ex-
ists."15 Similarly, the courts uniformly find a substantial relationship
when the attorney represented the former client in an earlier stage of the
same litigation. 1 " At the other extreme, the courts routinely find no sub-
stantial relationship when the prior representation concerned subjects un-
connected to the case before the court.117
Between the two extremes, the definition of "substantial relationship" is
sometimes unclear.11 8 Most courts examine the closeness of the contested
issues in the two representations. 1 9 In addition, some courts have disqual-
ified counsel because the lawyer or firm learned useful confidential infor-
mation concerning the policies or practices of a former client.1""
showing that he received no confidential information from his former client, the client, a lay-
man who has reposed confidence and trust in his attorney, will feel that the attorney has
escaped on a technicality. If courts protect only a client's disclosures to his attorney, and fail to
safeguard the attorney-client relationship itself-a relationship which must be one of trust and
reliance-they can only undermine the public's confidence in the legal system as a means for
adjudicating disputes.
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (footnote omitted).
113. 113 F. Supp. at 269. Accord Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224
n.3 (7th Cir. 1978); NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1976); Reaco Servs. v.
Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
114. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-55 (2d Cir.
1975) (discussing such cases).
115. See, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F.Supp. 265, 268-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); King v. King, 52 Ill. App. 3d 749, 752-53, 367 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (1977); In re
Palmieri, 76 N.J. 51, 61-63, 385 A.2d 856, 861 (1978).
116. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (5th Cir.
1981); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
117. See, e.g., Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 874 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Tin-
kle v. Ravena Dev. Corp., 60 A.D.2d 697, 697, 400 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (1977); Pennsylvania Power
& Light Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 74 Pa. D. & C.2d 431, 440-41 (C.P. Lehigh Co. 1975).
118. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-57 (2d Cir.
1975).
119. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir.
1981); Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 646 F.2d 1020, 1029-30 (5th Cir.
1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978); Reardon v.
Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 475, 416 A.2d 852, 860 (1980).
The Sixth Circuit finds a substantial relationship when the former representation relates to the
"subject matter" of the current litigation, even without a showing that the prior representation could
be connected with contested issues in the current case. See General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608
F.2d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit apparently has taken a similar approach. St
Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980) (substantial relationship even when issues in
former and current cases not identical).
120. In Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 416 A.2d 852 (1980), the New Jersey Supreme
Court ordered the disqualification of plaintiff's counsel in part because the attorney's prior representa-
tion of the defendant made him aware of defense strategies. In Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653
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In essence, the civil disqualification cases analyze the nature of the pri-
or client representation and the usefulness of information that a lawyer
might have learned from that type of representation, rather than trying to
reconstruct what the lawyer actually learned or used against the former
client. The opposite is true in criminal cases. Even though there may be a
"substantial relationship" between the subject matter of the defense law-
yer's prior representation of a prosecution witness and issues that are rele-
vant to an effective cross-examination of the witness on behalf of the de-
fendant, the defendant's conviction will not be reversed unless he can show
that his lawyer did not in fact probe those issues, in order to protect the
confidences of the prosecution witness.
United States v. Alberti""' illustrates the dichotomy between the treat-
ments of successive representation in civil and criminal cases. Alberti in-
volved a conspiracy to print and distribute $200,000 in counterfeit bills.
Edward Korjus, one of the co-conspirators, pled guilty to his indictment
and subsequently was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in a related
indictment charging Mary Alberti with various counterfeiting offenses.
Alberti retained the lawyer who had earlier represented Korjus in the
companion case. When Alberti's case proceeded to trial, Korjus was called
as a government witness. The lawyer informed the trial court of his ear-
lier representation of Korjus, but stated that there was no conflict of inter-
est, since Korjus had told him a version of the facts that exonerated Al-
berti completely. Korjus's courtroom testimony, however, seriously
implicated Alberti, describing her as "the moving force" in certain aspects
of the conspiracy. 22 Alberti was convicted and sentenced to seven years in
prison.
If Korjus had sought to disqualify Alberti's lawyer in an analogous civil
action, the Second Circuit would have granted the motion without hesita-
tion, since the opportunity for the lawyer to disclose Korjus's confidences
F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981), the plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully discharged by Logan. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's disqualification order in part because plaintiff's counsel, who
represented an entity integrally related to the defendant, could learn about the defendant's hiring and
firing policies.
121. 470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973).
122. The Second Circuit's opinion gives no indication why the prosecutor, although present when
defense counsel told the court that Korjus had exonerated Alberti, id. at 880, did not volunteer that
Korjus's testimony would contradict the version of the facts he had previously given to Alberti's coun-
sel. The appellate court also overlooked the fact that the trial court made no inquiry into the potential
conflict of interest after defense counsel apprised the court of the possible problem. In retrospect,
defense counsel's comments to the court seem absurd. If Korjus's version of the facts exonerated Al-
berti completely, why was the government calling Korjus as a witness, and presumably as its star
witness?
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would be "patently clear."' " Disqualification would be required, not
merely because the two cases were "substantially related," but because
they were "exactly the same litigation." 12' The court would not have in-
quired whether the lawyer was actually protecting Korjus's confidences
and secrets or was using them for Alberti's advantage. The conflict in
client obligations standing alone would have been sufficient to disqualify
counsel.
In the actual criminal case, however, the Second Circuit affirmed the
conviction because Alberti could not show that she had been harmed by
the lawyer's successive representation. 2 Relying on the trial transcript,
the court concluded that Alberti "actually derived some advantage . . .
[as] a result of the information that [the attorney] had received from
Korjus during the time that he represented him."1 2 The record also
showed a "lengthy and vigorous" cross-examination.12 7 Finally, the court
noted that Korjus had been sentenced before Alberti's trial and concluded
that there was no conflict of interest because "there was no longer any
interest of Korjus that [the lawyer] had to protect and that might have
compromised his representation of Alberti.)1 28
The argument that Alberti "actually derived some advantage" from his
prior representation is frequently used by appellate courts for affirmances
in similar cases. 2 ' According to this rationale, another defense lawyer
would not be privy to confidential information concerning the witness and
could not be as effective in cross-examination or in pre-trial investiga-
tion.130 To the extent that secrets can be uncovered through investigation
by any counsel, however, a defendant is prejudiced by being denied a law-
yer who can freely cross-examine the witness.1
123. That Korjus was only a witness against Alberti, and not an adverse party, as in the civil
disqualification cases, should not affect the outcome. The adversity requirement of the substantial
relationship test is satisfied when the "interests" of the former client are "materially adverse" to the
interest of the current client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1983). It
seems logical to apply this standard to a hostile witness, regardless of whether or not the two clients
are both parties in the same case.
124. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).




129. See United States v. James, 505 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1975); Harrison v. United States,
387 F.2d 614, 615 (5th Cir. 1968); State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802, 814 (S.D. 1978).
130. United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1976); Alberti, 470 F.2d at 881.
131. "Unlike [defense counsel, who had previously represented the prosecution witness and] who
was not free to use the privileged information, another attorney ingenious enough to ferret out the
same information. . . would have been free to use it." People v. Grigsby, 47 I1. App. 3d 812, 819,
365 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1977).
A lawyer who previously represented the witness may feel compelled to avoid probing confidential
subjects during cross-examination. Justice Stevens, while on the Seventh Circuit, commented that:
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The Alberti court's reliance on the "lengthy and vigorous" cross-ex-
amination of the prosecution witness exemplifies another frequent ration-
ale for affirming convictions in former-client conflict cases.13 2 A transcript
of what appears to be a thorough cross-examination, however, has little
bearing on the existence of a conflict of interest. " 3 The lawyer suffering
from a conflict may avoid only one subject on cross-examination and ex-
tensively cover all others, but the defendant may still be denied a fair
opportunity for acquittal.
Finally, the Second Circuit's conclusion that there was no conflict of
interest since Korjus had been sentenced before Alberti's trial'" reflects a
frequently made distinction between the "past" representation of a prose-
cution witness and the simultaneous representation of both defendant and
witness. " 5 The test usually enunciated for defining "past" representation
is whether the lawyer's representation of the witness ended before the
commencement of the defendant's trial. 3 6 If the lawyer represented the
witness in a criminal matter, as in Alberti, the courts usually conclude
that the representation of the witness concluded when the witness was
sentenced.1 7 After sentencing, the courts reason, a lawyer has no continu-
ing obligation to his client. " 8
There are several serious deficiencies in this analysis. First, it ignores
the plain language of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states: "The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
"Most obviously, there might be a temptation to use [confidential] information to impeach the former
client. We do not regard this risk as serious, however, for we think the courts can generally rely on
the sound discretion of members of the bar to treat privileged information with appropriate respect."
United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1976). For examples of cases in which the defendant was disadvantaged by his lawyer's prior
representation of a prosecution witness, see Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978).
132. See United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1973); Olshen v. McMann, 378
F.2d 993, 994 (2d Cir. 1967); State v. Theodore, 118 N.H. 548, 551, 392 A.2d 122, 124 (1978); State
v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802, 814 (S.D. 1978).
133. The Supreme Court recently noted in an analogous context that the "evil" of the conflict "is
in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing. . . ." Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (emphasis added).
134. United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 919
(1973).
135. See United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1264 n.13 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.) (discuss-
ing distinction), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). A similar distinction between successive represen-
tation and simultaneous representation is made in civil cases. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271,
280 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976); cf.
Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65-66, 203 A.2d 82, 84-85 (1964) (stressing importance
of element of simultaneity in finding of ethical violation).
136. See United States ex rel. Kachinski v. Cavell, 453 F.2d 581, 582 (3d Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 362 Mass. 782, 783, 291 N.E.2d 607, 608 (1973); Commonwealth v. Biancone, 393
A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. Super. 1978).
137. Kachinski, 453 F.2d at 582-83.
138. Id. at 583; Commonwealth v. Smith, 362 Mass. at 783-84, 291 N.E.2d at 608.
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secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment." '
To the extent that Alberti's lawyer learned such "confidences" and
"secrets" in the course of representing Korjus, he owed a continuing duty
to Korjus not to reveal them. When a lawyer is required to cross-examine
a former client on the very subject of their professional relationship and
the credibility of the former client's testimony is at issue, the lawyer must
choose between violating Canon Four or providing ineffective representa-
tion to his current client.1 40
Moreover, the rule that a prosecution witness is a "former client" if he
has been sentenced before the defendant's trial commences ignores conflict
of interest problems that may result from the simultaneous representation
of the witness and defendant in the pre-trial stages of a case. If the lawyer
represents both clients before the witness enters a guilty plea, the conflict
of interest is especially great. It is in the defendant's interest for the poten-
tial witness to plead not guilty and remain unavailable to the government.
Counseling the witness to enter a guilty plea is tantamount to contributing
to the government's evidence against the remaining defendant.141 Simi-
larly, the lawyer's representation of the potential prosecution witness dur-
ing the pre-trial stage of the defendant's case often affects the defendant's
own opportunities to plead to a reduced charge in return for cooperation
with the government.
There are numerous problems with the approach taken by the courts in
the Alberti situation. The reviewing court should not have to speculate
about what counsel might have omitted in cross-examination, why the
questions were omitted, and whether the defendant would have had a
stronger case if the questions were asked, especially since lawyers often
purposefully omit subjects on cross-examination for a variety of tactical
reasons.1 42 Criminal case law should be brought in line with civil disqual-
139. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1981); cf. T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (lawyer "is enjoined for all time"
from disclosing client's confidences).
140. For example, an essential line of cross-examination in Alberti was an attack on Korjus's
motives in testifying for the government. Such an attack necessarily included a thorough probe of the
promises made to and by the witness in his plea bargain. It also had to demonstrate to the jury that
Korjus received a suspended two-year prison sentence, and make the inference that if he did not "do
well" in his testimony he might jeopardize his own freedom. Alberti's lawyer, however, was obligated
by DR 4-101(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility not to "embarrass" Korjus and not
to raise matters learned during their former relationship which were "likely to be detrimental" to
Korjus. An independent lawyer, not impeded by such professional obligations, would be free to cross-
examine at will concerning the terms of Korjus's plea bargain and his motives for testifying.
141. Some courts hold that when a lawyer represents co-defendants, an offer from the prosecution
for one client to plead guilty in return for cooperation against the remaining client or clients autonati-
cally creates a conflict of interest. Chambers v. State, 264 Ark. 279, 281-82, 571 S.W.2d 79, 81-82
(1979); People v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 626, 629, 156 Cal. Rptr. 487, 488 (1979).
142. See P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY 155-71 (1979) (attorney should limit cross-examina-
tion to relevant subjects); R. KEETON, TRIAL TAcTICS AND METHODS 95 (2d ed. 1973) (attorney
should use knowledge of witness as guide for subjects to omit); F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION 18-19 (1936) (attorney should avoid asking "reckless" questions).
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ification decisions by focusing more on avoiding potential conflicts of in-
terest rather than speculating after the fact about what might have hap-
pened in the trial court. The next subsection explores the possibility of
bringing civil disqualification principles to the criminal courts.
3. Applying a Substantial Relationship Test in Criminal Cases
Invoking the civil disqualification standard in criminal cases involves
two steps. First, the courts must adopt the substantial relationship test to
determine whether the cross-examination of a former client poses an un-
acceptable risk of conflict of interest. Second, courts should implement an
appropriate pre-trial procedure to avoid conflict of interest problems in
advance.
Judges in criminal cases should accept as a basic principle that when
an earlier professional relationship is substantially related to the issues on
which a former client will be cross-examined, the lawyer who must con-
duct the cross-examination has a conflict between the duties owed to each
client. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(a) spe-
cifically adopts substantial relationship terminology to prohibit lawyers
from representing clients whose interests are adverse to those of former
clients.14 Nothing in the Rule or its Official Comment limits the test to
civil cases, and there is no sound reason why this problem is any less
troublesome in criminal practice. Since the Sixth Amendment entitles the
defendant to counsel "untrammeled" by divided loyalty,""' the lawyer
must be disqualified, unless both the witness and the defendant make an
informed decision to waive the conflict.1 45
The substantial relationship test not only assures effective assistance of
counsel for the defendant, but also guarantees to the witness the confiden-
tiality of his relationship with the lawyer. It is fair to assume that often
the former client who testifies for the prosecution was himself represented
on a criminal charge.114 Rules of confidentiality are designed to promote
open and trusting communication between client and lawyer. Trust and
143. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1983).
144. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
145. See infra pp. 49-51, 59-61.
146. This is certainly true for all clients of a public defender office handling only criminal cases.
For example, all former clients of the Maricopa County Public Defender Office reported in the study
discussed supra pp. 7-11 had been criminal defendants. With private counsel, the number depends on
the percentage of the attorney's practice (or his firm's practice) that is devoted to criminal law. A
recent survey, conducted by the author, of all lawyers handling criminal cases in Maricopa County,
Arizona, found that only one fourth of the private lawyers interviewed devoted more than 50% of their
practice to criminal law. Lowenthal, Theoretical Notes on Lawyer Competency and an Overview of the
Phoenix Criminal Lawyer Study, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 451, 497. This suggests that, at least in some
jurisdictions, a substantial proportion of the clients of criminal lawyers in private practice are repre-
sented 'in non-criminal matters.
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communication are difficult to develop when the client must disclose infor-
mation related to his own wrongdoing, particularly to a lawyer from a
different economic, ethnic, or racial group, as is frequently the case in
criminal representation. 4 A rule that permits the lawyer to probe into
the subject matter of the lawyer-client relationship at a later time, when
the former client is under oath in a public courtroom, can only undermine
that trust.
An appropriate pre-trial mechanism could take several forms. Both the
defense lawyer and the prosecutor might be placed under an ethical re-
sponsibility to notify the court promptly whenever either counsel discovers
that the defense lawyer previously represented a witness for the prosecu-
tion. 48 The trial court could then conduct an inquiry to determine if a
substantial relationship exists between the earlier representation and fore-
seeable issues in the current case. 149 If the trial court finds such a rela-
tionship, defense counsel should be disqualified unless both the defendant
and the witness knowingly waive the conflict. If the court finds no sub-
stantial relationship, the case would proceed to trial; if the defendant is
convicted, he can prevail in a post-conviction challenge by showing that a
conflict of interest actually impaired counsel's cross-examination of the
witness.' 50 Finally, if neither party apprises the court before trial of the
earlier representation, the defendant should be permitted to challenge his
conviction by demonstrating that a substantial relationship existed, re-
gardless of whether he can show that counsel was actually impaired in
cross-examination. 51
Although appellate courts occasionally have emphasized the importance
of defense counsel's disclosing any prior representation to the court before
147. See 3 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES 1-64 to 1-65 (1974).
148. A requirement that counsel for either party inform the court immediately upon learning of
prior representation probably will have more impact on defense counsel than on prosecutors, because
the government attorney will often not be cognizant of an earlier representation unless notified by
either the defense lawyer or the witness. Sometimes the witness may be aware of the identity of the
defense lawyer before trial (e.g., through participation at a preliminary hearing), but frequently the
witness will not learn this fact until he is sworn to testify in court. On the other hand, assuming that
he is provided a list of prosecution witnesses before trial, the defense lawyer can be expected to
discover the potential conflict of interest.
149. Federal district courts are required to conduct a similar inquiry in all joint representation
cases. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 320-21 (8th Cir. 1978), cerl.
denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v. Waldman, 579 F.2d 649, 651-52 (1st Cir. 1978);
Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1967). This inquiry is not compelled by the
Sixth Amendment, hut is instead an exercise of the Court's supervisory power. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 346 & n.10 (1980).
150. See infra note 159 (discussing necessity of proving actual prejudice).
151. However, if the prosecution can demonstrate that defense counsel deliberately failed to notify
the trial court of the earlier representation, the defendant probably should be required to meet the
Cuyler actual-impairment standard.
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trial,152 no rule of professional responsibility presently requires disclos-
ure.153 Such a rule would be desirable for several reasons. First, it would
provide an effective means of alerting the trial court to the danger of con-
flict of interest before trial,'" thus avoiding a later mistrial or reversal of
the defendant's conviction. Second, it would minimize the risk of manipu-
lation by defendants or their lawyers who intend to create an issue on
appeal beyond the control of trial courts to prevent.15 5 Third, it would
protect witnesses by lessening the risk that confidential information will
be disclosed during cross-examination, and would protect defendants from
the risk that counsel will refrain from certain issues on cross to preserve
the sanctity of the earlier lawyer-client relationship.
The trial court's determination of what constitutes a substantial rela-
tionship between the earlier representation of the prosecution witness and
the foreseeable issues in the current case could rely on three decades of
civil disqualification cases. For example, if the defense counsel had repre-
sented the witness in an earlier stage of the same prosecution or in a
companion case, the existence of a substantial relationship would be "pa-
tently clear." 1" Disqualification would also be appropriate if there were a
reasonable likelihood that the prosecution witness would retain the de-
fense lawyer in the future. Appellate courts have reversed convictions
where "the lawyer's pecuniary interest in possible future business may
cause him to avoid vigorous cross-examination which might be embarrass-
ing or offensive to the witness. 157 Such reversals have occurred not be-
cause the defendant could demonstrate that his lawyer actually refrained
152. See Olshen v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993, 994 (2d Cir. 1967). On at least two occasions, the
Supreme Court has noted a duty of defense counsel to notify the court immediately upon discovering a
conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 & n.l1 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978); see also United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1263 & n.11 (7th Cir.
1975) (foreshadowing Holloway and Cuyler), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). I am suggesting a
further duty of counsel: notifying the court of successive representation, regardless of whether or not
counsel believes a conflict of interest exists.
153. The ABA instructs counsel to inform the defendant, but not the court, of any possible inter-
est that might interfere with counsel's loyalty to the defendant. See ABA PROjEr ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5(a) (Approved
Draft 1971).
154. In civil cases, the former client is a party to the litigation, represented by counsel, and pre-
sumably aware of the identity of opposing counsel from the time of pleadings, or at least from the
time of the taking of the former client's deposition. Therefore, the former client will normally have an
opportunity to move for disqualification before trial. In a criminal case, by contrast, the former client
is only a witness for the government and often may not discover the identity of defense counsel until
he is called to testify. The judge-and the prosecutor-may not be aware of the prior professional
relationship unless it is disclosed by defense counsel.
155. See supra p. 26.
156. See supra p. 30.
157. United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); see Zurita v. United States, 410 F.2d 477, 478-80 (7th Cir. 1969);
United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1966); People v. Stoval, 40 Ill.
2d 109, 112-13, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (1968).
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from asking specific questions, but instead because the situation itself re-
sulted in counsel's divided loyalty.
When the earlier representation of the prosecution witness was totally
unrelated to the defendant's prosecution, no substantial relationship exists
and, as in civil cases, counsel should not be disqualified.1"8 The defendant
may wish to pursue the issue in post-conviction proceedings, but unless he
requested a substitution of counsel before trial, the reviewing court should
require him to demonstrate that cross-examination was actually impaired
under the Cuyler v. Sullivan standard. 59
The most difficult cases under the substantial relationship rule would
occur, as they do under the current standard, when the earlier representa-
tion did not concern the same events or transactions as the defendant's
case, but nonetheless might provide counsel with information useful for
the cross-examination of the witness.""' Again certain principles developed
in civil cases would facilitate the court's determination. First, the court
should consider carefully the extent of the attorney's access to information
potentially useful for cross-examination. If, for example, the lawyer's ear-
lier representation of the witness was only brief or peripheral,"' the court
should not assume, absent a showing by either party, that the lawyer ac-
quired useful confidential information." 2 Another practical consideration
might be the importance of the witness to the prosecution's case 63 and the
collateral question of the importance to the defense of challenging the wit-
ness's credibility.1 1
4
158. For examples of such cases, see Bryan v. United States, 645 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States ex rel. Kachinski v. Cavell, 453 F.2d 581, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1971); Bynum v. United
States, 422 F.Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Crisp v. State, 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d 115
(1979); People v. Frisbie, 70 A.D.2d 1053, 1053-54, 417 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552-53 (1979).
159. 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); see supra pp. 26-27. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Cuyler took a position similar to the one I have suggested here. He reasoned that if a defendant was
made aware of a possible conflict of interest in the trial court hut did not object to counsel's continuing
representation, the defendant should be required to meet the Cuyler test for post-conviction relief. 446
U.S. at 353 & n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring). However, according to Justice Brennan, if the defendant
was not apprised in the trial court of the risk of conflict of interest, he should be required to prove
only the "possibility" of a conflict of interest in order to obtain a new trial with different counsel. Id.
160. See supra p. 3.
161. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-754 (2d
Cir. 1975).
162. Id. at 754-57. In the criminal context, see United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505, 506-07
(1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Wright, 376 Mass. 725, 730-33, 383 N.E.2d 507, 511-12 (1978).
163. Compare United States ex rel. Kachinski v. Cavell, 453 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1971) (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting) (witness was "key Commonwealth witness") with Brown v. United States, 665
F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (witness relatively unimportant, since government's incriminating evi-
dence was "massive").
164. For example, in Taylor v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 764 (D.D.C. 1954), retod on other
grounds, 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam), defense counsel had represented an informer
who allegedly purchased narcotics from the defendant. The government dismissed the witness's case
three weeks before the defendant's trial. Since the defense lawyer's former client was the principal
government witness against the defendant and was apparently testifying in return for the dismissal of
his own case, the critical issue at trial was the former client's credibility.
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Requiring counsel to report any prior representation to the court before
trial would reduce the frequency of convicted defendants' raising the issue
for the first time in post-conviction proceedings, especially if sanctions are
available for failure to make a timely disclosure to the trial court."6 5
Nonetheless, occasionally a defendant may raise the issue in post-convic-
tion proceedings even though the matter was not brought to the attention
of the trial court. In such cases, it would make most sense to apply the
substantial relationship test retroactively unless there is evidence that the
defendant purposefully failed to raise the issue in the trial court. Such a
procedure still avoids the worst problems occurring under the current
standard, achieves consistency with the cases decided upon pre-trial mo-
tions, and treats the defendant fairly.
Two circumstances deserve further analysis, both under existing law
and under the proposed substantial relationship formulation. The first oc-
curs when the defense notifies the trial court of the prior representation
and requests a substitution of counsel, but the court refuses to grant the
request. The second arises when the prosecution moves to disqualify de-
fense counsel but both the defense lawyer and the defendant resist the
motion.
B. Defense Counsel Moves to Withdraw in the Trial Court
The government prosecutes Jane for murder. Jane's defense is that
she was in another city at the time of the offense. During the trial
the prosecutor calls Bill as a surprise witness to place Jane at the
scene of the offense. Jane's lawyer moves to withdraw from the case,
stating that Bill is a former client of his, and that he cannot cross-
examine Bill without revealing Bill's confidences. The court asks
Jane's counsel to disclose the facts underlying the alleged conflict of
interest, but the lawyer refuses, claiming that the information is
privileged. The court denies the motion to withdraw.
These facts raise several issues. First, if Jane is convicted, should a
reviewing court apply a different standard from the one that is followed
when no motion to withdraw was made in the trial court? Should a dis-
165. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), Chief Justice Burger commented in dicta
that when defense counsel files an "untimely" motion to withdraw for "dilatory" reasons, the trial
court has the "ability to deal with counsel who resort to such tactics." 435 U.S. at 486-87. In Coffelt
v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 31 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), the defense lawyer labored under a conflict of
interest, but allowed the case to go to trial without diligently reporting the conflict to the court. The
court later reduced counsel's fee from $1,000 to $100, despite the fact that the lawyer had been
retained privately by the defendant. Cf. In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1035 (2d Cir. 1976) (counsel
fined $1,500 for his "recklessness" in engaging in two representations, resulting in delay of second
trial, without informing either judge).
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tinction be made between a motion to withdraw that is filed weeks before
trial and one not made until the witness actually testifies? Can the court
require counsel to disclose why he believes that he is restricted from cross-
examining Bill adequately? Should the case be decided differently if Bill
states that he waives his lawyer-client privilege and consents to all ethical
improprieties that result from the disclosure of his confidences?
1. The Standard of Review when Counsel's Motion to Withdraw is
Denied
If a trial court denies defense counsel's motion to withdraw and the
defendant is convicted, the defendant will probably claim that the denial
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. The proper test to ap-
ply to such motions, and that used by most courts today, was articulated
in a 1978 Supreme Court decision, Holloway v. Arkansas.166 In Holloway,
a public defender representing three co-defendants moved three weeks
before trial, and again on the first day of trial, for separate counsel for
each defendant because of conflicts in their respective trial strategies, but
the court denied the motions. Even though the lawyer had not stated a
detailed basis for the claimed conflict of interest, the Supreme Court held
that his motions imposed a duty on the trial judge either to appoint inde-
pendent counsel for each defendant or to "take adequate steps to ascertain
whether the risk [of conflict of interest] was too remote" to require sepa-
rate lawyers.1 67 Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "several interrelated
considerations" should compel a trial court to grant such motions.168 First,
the defense lawyer
"is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine
when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the
course of a trial." . . . Second, defense attorneys have the obligation,
upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of
the problem. . . .Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and
"'when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the
court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.' "169
The Court concluded that the trial court's failure to appoint independent
counsel after a timely motion required reversal even without a showing of
specific prejudice to the defendants, because the right to effective counsel
166. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
167. Id. at 484.
168. Id. at 485.
169. Id. at 485-86 (quoting State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973), and
State v. Brazile, 226 La. 254, 266, 75 So. 2d 856, 860-61 (1954)).
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is both "fundamental" and "absolute."1 '0 Most lower courts have fol-
lowed Holloway in instances of successive representation."'
Although Holloway involved joint representation rather than an alleged
conflict of interest with a prosecution witness, the Court's discussion of
the trial judge's duty when counsel moves to withdraw applies logically to
the latter situation. The defendant's lawyer, rather than the court, is in
the best position to determine the strategy of the defense and to foresee
how the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses will affect that de-
fense. The defense attorney is also the only participant in the trial who is
aware of the usefulness of the particular confidences or secrets of a prose-
cution witness. It follows, after Holloway, that a trial court must accept
the word of an "officer of the court" that his cross-examination of a prose-
cution witness will be impaired by a prior representation, unless the court
is assured that the risk of a conflict of interest is "remote.' 7 2 Since denial
of the motion constitutes judicial interference with the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to unimpaired counsel, Holloway requires reversal even
though the defendant cannot show that he has been prejudiced by the
court's action.
Applying Holloway to witness-defendant conflicts of interest comports
with the civil disqualification case law and with the approach to criminal
cases suggested earlier in this Article. Holloway places on defense counsel
the primary responsibility for recognizing potential conflicts of interest
before trial and reporting them to the court. By requiring the trial court
to grant counsel's motion unless the risk of conflicting interests is "re-
mote," Holloway encourages the avoidance of ethical problems. The test
170. The Court interpreted an earlier joint representation case, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942), as requiring automatic reversal when a defense lawyer's request for separate counsel is
denied by the trial judge, and quoted language from Glasser which emphasized that "[t]he right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." 435 U.S. at 488 (quoting Glasser,
315 U.S. at 76). The Chief Justice also noted that since most conflicts of interest result in a lawyer's
refraining from doing something on behalf of a defendant, the typical record would fail to reveal the
prejudicial effects of a conflict of interest even when one occurs. Hence "a rule requiring a defendant
to show that a conflict of interest. . . prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be suscepti-
ble of intelligent, even-handed application." 435 U.S. at 490.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 644 F.2d 1008, 1012 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Morando, 628 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir.
1980); State v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 616, 620 (La. 1981). A few courts have refused to follow Hollo-
way in successive representation cases. One court, for example, distinguished Holloway on the ground
that it was limited to joint representation cases. State v. Theodore, 118 N.H. 548, 550, 392 A.2d 122,
123-24 (1978). Other courts have simply ignored Holloway, and have required a petitioner for post-
conviction relief to prove that he was prejudiced by an actual conflict of interest with a prosecution
witness. See Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817, 820-22 (1st Cir. 1980); State v. Means, 268
N.W.2d 802, 813-14 (S.D. 1978). Yet another court applied the standard in Cuyler v. Sullivan, see
supra pp. 26-27, rather than Holloway, to deny habeas relief, even though the petitioner's trial coun-
sel moved to withdraw from the case well in advance of trial. Alexander v. Housewright, 667 F.2d
556, 558 (8th Cir. 1981).
172. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978).
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eliminates highly speculative searches in post-conviction proceedings for
an actual conflict of interest. Finally, Holloway recognized the sensitive
problem counsel encounters in preserving client confidences when a trial
court analyzes the factual basis of a conflict of interest. Nevertheless,
lower courts have encountered several difficulties when applying Holloway
to witness-defendant conflicts of interest.
2. The Timing of a Motion to Withdraw
Both Holloway and Cuyler recognized an obligation of defense counsel
to advise the court immediately upon discovering a conflict of interest.173
Holloway emphasized that counsel's initial motion to withdraw had been
entered weeks before trial and was therefore timely."1 4 It also noted that
trial judges have the "ability to deal with" those "unscrupulous" lawyers
who wait until trial before moving to withdraw "for purposes of delay or
obstruction of the orderly conduct of the trial,' '17 ' implying that courts
might legitimately overrule an untimely motion to withdraw.1' Lower
court decisions demonstrate a similar concern about untimely motions al-
leging witness-defendant conflicts. Of twelve reported cases in which trial
courts denied motions to withdraw, only two involved a motion made
before trial.17 7 The motion was entered either during trial or on the eve of
trial in each of the other ten.17 8 Trial courts seem especially wary of a
tardy motion that appears to be a "tactic" or a "belated afterthought"' 7'
or that would necessitate delay, added expense, and inconvenience to ju-
rors and witnesses.' 80
These decisions reflect the experience of public defenders who partici-
pated in the survey described in Part II of this Article.8 1 Forty-nine of
173. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86
(1978).
174. 435 U.S. at 484.
175. Id. at 486-87.
176. However, this would seem to be very harsh for the defendant if he is totally unaware of the
prior representation before counsel's motion is made and if he is not a party to the stratagem.
177. See Alexander v. Housewright, 667 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1981); People v. Kyllonen, 80
Mich. App. 327, 330-31, 263 N.W.2d 55, 57 (1977).
178. See United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Morando, 628 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1980); Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817, 819 (1st
Cir. 1980); United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jeffers, 520
F.2d 1256, 1261 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); United States v. Cochran, 499
F.2d 380, 394 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505, 506 (1st Cir. 1973); People
v. Grigsby, 47 I1. App. 3d 812, 814-15, 365 N.E.2d 481, 482 (1977); State v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d
616, 618-19 (La. 1981); State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802, 813 (S.D. 1978).
179. See United States v. Cochran, 499 F.2d 380, 394 (5th Cir. 1974.)
180. See Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817, 819 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussing trial court's
"pique at . . . last minute attempt to withdraw"); State v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 616 (La. 1981);
People v. Grigsby, 47 Il1. App. 3d 812, 820, 365 N.E.2d 481, 486 (1977).
181. See supra pp. 11-17. The survey was conducted one year before the Supreme Court decision
in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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fifty-nine offices indicated that the courts in their respective jurisdictions
routinely permit withdrawal and grant continuances to allow the substi-
tuted counsel to prepare, even if motions to withdraw are not filed until
trial."8 2 Several defenders noted that because they normally discover the
identity of prosecution witnesses well in advance of trial, motions to with-
draw are rarely made at the trial stage. However, a few respondents noted
significant trial court reluctance to grant continuances at the trial stage
without a strong or detailed factual showing of conflict.1 "
Trial courts may be reluctant to grant tardy motions to withdraw be-
cause of a legitimate concern for efficient judicial administration, but it
would be short-sighted to assume that most untimely motions are the "tac-
tics" of "unscrupulous" lawyers. Interestingly, in each of the ten reported
cases in which trial courts denied late motions to withdraw, defense coun-
sel did not learn the identity of the prosecution witness until the eve of the
trial or during the trial itself. Each case involved a "surprise witness" for
the government. In one instance, the government instructed the witness to
use a fictitious name when testifying before a grand jury. 4 In another
case, the government successfully moved the court to add the witness's
name to the prosecution witness list one day before the trial was to be-
gin."8 5 The other eight cases occurred in the few jurisdictions that do not
provide for defense discovery of the identity of government witnesses
before trial."8
In keeping with the Holloway standard, all courts should require de-
fense discovery of the identity of prosecution witnesses at the earliest feasi-
182. Respondents were asked: "If a conflict of interest has not been discovered until the trial stage
of a case, do the courts in your jurisdiction routinely grant a continuance to allow your organization to
withdraw and allow new counsel to prepare the case?"
183. For example, a staff attorney in the Federal Public Defender program in Chicago com-
mented that the federal courts in Chicago granted continuances for the appointment of new counsel at
trial "provided the court is satisfied that the conflict was only recently discovered and is not being
used as a delaying tactic." Questionnaire response of Federal Public Defender, Chicago (1977) (on
file with author).
184. See People v. Grigsby, 47 I1. App. 3d 812, 815, 365 N.E.2d 481, 482 (1977).
185. See State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802, 813 (S.D. 1978).
186. Six of the eight cases were federal court prosecutions. The Jencks Act prohibits disclosure of
the pretrial statements of government witnesses in the federal courts before those witnesses have testi-
fied on direct examination at trial. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (West Supp. 1983). In addition, the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision for the pre-trial disclosure of the identity of
government witnesses, except in very limited circumstances. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(b).
One of the two state court prosecutions, State v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 616 (La. 1981), occurred in
Louisiana, which prohibits almost all pretrial discovery by the defense. See State v. Rose, 271 So. 2d
863, 865-66 (La. 1973); Comment, Criminal Discovery i, Louisiana-"The Defense is Not Enti-
tiled," 23 Loy. L. REV. 440, 454-55 (1977). The other case, Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d
817 (1st Cir. 1980), was a New Hampshire state prosecution that resulted in a federal habeas corpus
petition. In New Hampshire, only defendants in capital cases are entitled to pre-trial disclosure of
prosecution witnesses, and even then only twenty-four hours before trial. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
604:1 (1974); see State v. Schena, 110 N.H. 73, 74, 260 A.2d 93, 94 (1969) (court's denial of motion
to compel disclosure of names of state's witnesses not an abuse of discretion).
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ble time to avoid motions for the appointment or substitution of indepen-
dent counsel during trial."' 7 Such early discovery squarely places the
responsibility for identifying and avoiding potential conflicts of interest
before trial on defense counsel."" If the defense knows the identity of all
prosecution witnesses well in advance of trial, only an unanticipated re-
buttal witness would excuse a tardy motion to withdraw." 9
3. Requiring Disclosure of the Factual Basis of an Alleged Conflict of
Interest
Although a defense lawyer's motion to withdraw alerts a trial court that
a conflict of interest may impair the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, Holloway does not require the court to grant the motion. An
alternative is for the court to "take adequate steps" to assure that the
possibility of conflict is "remote." ' 90 Holloway does not articulate what
those "adequate steps" might be, but two possibilities exist in cases involv-
ing the cross-examination of former clients. First, the trial judge may re-
quest the defense lawyer to disclose the basis of the potential conflict of
interest, so that the court may determine if the possibility is "remote."
Second, the court may ask the witness to consent to counsel's continued
participation in the case.
Disclosing the factual basis for an alleged conflict may avoid a costly
continuance or mistrial when counsel's motion is tardy, since the disclos-
ure might show that there is little chance of a conflict of interest. Re-
quired disclosure, however, may force counsel to reveal client confidences
187. Early discovery of prosecution witness names is also desirable for reasons beyond the scope of
this paper. See S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CASES AND COMMENTARY
759-60 n.22 (1980) (disclosure necessary to refresh defendant's memory regarding transaction, and to
enable effective cross-examination by defense counsel); Rooney & Evans, Let's Rethink the Jencks Act
and Federal Criminal Discovery, 62 A.B.A. J. 1313 (1976) (fears of increased perjury resulting from
liberal discovery are unfounded).
188. The prosecutor may not want to disclose the identity of a particular witness before trial for
the witness's own protection. This is the major rationale for the federal rule. See S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 187, at 757-59. If the prosecutor does not disclose the identity of a particular witness or
witnesses before trial, for this or any other reason, it should be the prosecutor's obligation to ascertain
from the witness whether the witness has had a prior lawyer-client relationship with defense counsel.
189. Discovery rules sometimes distinguish rebuttal witnesses from other prospective witnesses.
For example, the ABA Standards require the prosecution to disclose before trial the names and ad-
dresses of all witnesses it intends to call as part of its case-in-chief; rebuttal witnesses are implicitly
excluded from the requirement. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.1(a)(i) (Approved Draft 1970). Dis-
covery laws in several states include similar provisions. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1(a)(1); ILL
ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(a)(i)(Smith-Hurd 1976); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01(1); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-13-107, 40-17-106 (1982). But cf. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(e) (1973) (prosecutor shall
provide to defense "a list of all witnesses known to the prosecuting attorney to have information which
may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense of the person charged with respect
thereto").
190. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978).
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or other information he obtained in his fiduciary role. This dilemma is
particularly acute if the disclosure includes information concerning crimi-
nal wrongdoing by either the witness1" 1 or the defendant.19 Arguably,
such an intrusion into the lawyer-client relationship may itself impair the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.19 3
Holloway recognized the substantial risks in requiring disclosure. Al-
though the Court did not "preclude" a trial judge from "exploring the
adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's representations regarding a con-
flict of interests,' 194 it recognized that "[s]uch compelled disclosure creates
significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure is to a
judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences" for one or more
of the affected clients.19 5 Holloway declined to examine the issue further,
however, stating that: "This case does not require an inquiry into the
extent of a court's power to compel an attorney to disclose confidential
communications that he concludes would be damaging to his client."' 9'
The issue left unresolved by Holloway has divided lower courts. In Cal-
ifornia, a trial court cannot require defense counsel to disclose any of the
underlying bases of a claimed conflict of interest and must grant a motion
for separate counsel on the strength of counsel's averment.19 7 The Califor-
191. One appellate court suggested that if defense counsel discloses criminal conduct by the wit-
ness, the trial judge would be obligated to report it to the proper authorities. See People v. Grigsby, 47
Ill. App. 3d 812, 819 n.1, 365 N.E.2d 481, 486 n.1 (1977).
192. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487 n.11 (1978).
193. See Uhl v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 526, 528, 112 Cal. Rptr. 478, 479 (1974).
If the defense lawyer refuses to disclose the specific factual basis of the alleged conflict of interest
and the trial court denies the motion for separate counsel, there is a substantial risk of reversal.
Brooks v. Hopper, 597 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1979), a joint representation case, illustrates this risk. A
court-appointed attorney represented three co-defendants on a robbery charge. The lawyer informed
the court before trial that a conflict of interest had developed and requested separate counsel for each
defendant. When the lawyer refused to explain the conflict on the ground of attorney-client privilege,
the court denied the motion. The first two defendants testified at trial and denied their guilt. The
third defendant then testified that one of his co-defendants had confessed to him responsibility for the
robbery. Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the lawyer could not argue the case effectively
for each of his clients. 597 F.2d at 59.
194. Holloway v. Arkansas, 453 U.S. 475, 487 (1978).
195. Id. at 487 n.11. At another point the opinion noted that defense counsel might not have
presented his requests for separate counsel in greater detail because he was "confronted with a risk of
violating, by more disclosure, his duty of confidentiality to his clients." Id. at 485.
196. Id. at 487 n.11.
197. In Uhl v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 526, 112 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1974), a public
defender informed the trial judge that the defendant had a conflict of interest with another public
defender client, but counsel refused to disclose even the identity of the second client. When the trial
court declined to require any further disclosure and agreed to appoint separate counsel to represent
the defendant, the prosecution sought interlocutory relief in the California Court of Appeal, arguing
that the trial court should not appoint independent counsel without a specific showing of conflict of
interest. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that any disclosure, over counsel's objection, would
violate the defendant's "right to untrammeled and unimpaired assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
state and federal Constitutions and its necessary corollary, the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship, the Canons of Ethics and the applicable California law." Id. at 528, 112 Cal. Rptr. at
479. Each of the twelve California public defender offices responding to the survey described in Part
II reported that motions for appointment of independent counsel are always granted without the
disclosure of the underlying facts.
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nia approach allows an attorney to fulfill his fiduciary obligations to each
client, but does not prevent a lawyer from filing a spurious motion to
cause a delay or mistrial."' 8 Such concerns have caused courts in a few
jurisdictions to refuse to appoint independent counsel for a defendant un-
less the lawyer seeking to withdraw can substantiate the claimed conflict
of interest.199
The national survey of public defender offices described in Part II of
this Article sheds some light on the actual practices of trial courts in re-
quiring disclosure of the factual bases of alleged conflicts of interest.20 0 As
indicated in Table Five, 65% of the respondents indicated that they are
permitted to withdraw from cases without any required disclosure of the
underlying facts constituting the conflict.20 ' The other 35% stated that
they are required to substantiate motions for the appointment of indepen-
dent counsel by revealing the factual bases of conflicts of interest. Of the
twenty-three offices in this category, however, seven reported that disclos-
ure is required only occasionally. In addition, sixteen of the twenty-three
offices indicated that they are permitted to avoid ethical problems by stat-
ing the nature of antagonistic client interests without revealing confiden-
tial information. Only seven offices indicated that required disclosure in-
trudes upon attorney-client relations or that courts sometimes do not
accept vague descriptions of the factual bases of asserted conflicts.
4. Proposed Standards for Reviewing a Motion to Withdraw
When the timing of a motion to withdraw is considered with the dis-
closure issue, it is possible to draw certain conclusions from the survey
and the case law. First, trial courts rarely deny a motion for the substitu-
tion of counsel or require the defense lawyer to disclose the factual basis
for the motion when counsel raises the issue sufficiently in advance of trial
to avoid substantial problems of delay, inconvenience for witnesses, or in-
terference with the smooth operation of the court calendar. This judicial
198. Justice Powell forecast this problem in his Holloway dissent, commenting that "the path may
have been cleared for potentially disruptive demands for separate counsel predicated solely on the
representations of defense counsel." 435 U.S. at 493 (Powell, J., dissenting).
199. See United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976); State v. Baker, 288 So. 2d 52 (La. 1973).
200. Sixty-six public defender offices responded to the question: "Do the courts in your jurisdic-
tion require you to state the factual basis of a conflict of interest before allowing you to withdraw
from the representation of a client?" The sixty-six organizations included the public defender offices
in four California counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and Santa Clara. Although these agencies
did not participate in the national survey, the author interviewed the chief attorney in each of these
organizations in December, 1976. Their verbal responses have been tallied along with the written
responses of survey respondents in Table Five.
201. This figure includes the twelve California counties who reported that they follow the rule in
Uhl v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 526, 112 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1974).
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deference is consistent with the Supreme Court's observation that trial
courts should respect the timely declarations of lawyers, as officers of the
court, regarding their ethical obligations in representing client interests.202
Timely pre-trial withdrawal motions should always be granted without
question. The only reason for intruding into the privacy of the lawyer-
client relationship in such a case would be concern over the expense of
appointing independent counsel. This reason is not only inapposite in
cases in which the defendant can afford to retain counsel, but also seems
insufficient to require disclosure when new counsel must be paid at public
expense, in view of the risks of revealing client confidences.
When a motion to withdraw based on an alleged conflict of interest is
made at trial, concerns over efficient judicial administration may some-
times justify an inquiry to determine whether the risk of conflict of inter-
est is "remote." However, those jurisdictions having discovery rules re-
quiring the prosecution to disclose the identity of the witness before trial
rarely experience problems with untimely motions for substituted counsel
based on a witness-defendant conflict. A change in the discovery rules of
the federal courts, and of a few states, thus would minimize disclosure
problems in successive representation cases.
It is still possible to avoid violations of the attorney-client privilege even
if counsel files an untimely withdrawal motion. 03 When a motion is not
202. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978).
203. Reformed discovery rules requiring pretrial defense discovery of the identity of prosecution
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registered before trial, most judges still do not require a detailed factual
demonstration of the underlying conflict of interest. Defense counsel often
can outline the conflict without revealing the confidences or secrets of ei-
ther client. A declaration, for example, that the defense lawyer previously
represented the prosecution witness in an earlier criminal case and that
the inducements for the former client's guilty plea in that case will be a
proper subject for cross-examination, should satisfy the trial court while
not revealing specific matters of confidential information.'
More detailed disclosure rarely should be necessary. However, if coun-
sel's generalized statement fails to satisfy the court of the need to delay or
abort trial, other alternatives exist. During his tenure on the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, Justice Stevens suggested an in camera disclosure
by defense counsel to the trial judge, outlining the factual basis for an
alleged conflict of interest, to provide "adequate protection to the interests
at stake."2" 5 Presumably such a proceeding would be ex parte, to mini-
mize the detrimental effects of disclosing client secrets. A survey respon-
dent reported that the courts in his jurisdiction sometimes have required
an ex parte in camera disclosure to a judge other than the judge who is
presiding over the defendant's trial. 06
A number of courts and commentators, however, have rejected the in
camera disclosure approach, contending that any disclosure of client confi-
dences, even to a judge in camera, impermissibly impairs the lawyer-
client privilege.207 To alleviate this concern, courts could employ the "sub-
stantial relationship" formulation of the civil disqualification case law.
Counsel's statement, for example, that he previously represented the wit-
ness in a companion prosecution based on the same events or transactions
witnesses would affect only those motions to withdraw which are based on a conflict between the
defendant and a prosecution witness. It would have no bearing on the timing of motions for separate
counsel based on other types of conflict of interest, such as that between jointly represented co-
defendants. Moreover, it appears unlikely that discovery reform will occur in the federal courts in the
near future, since Congress recently rejected this change in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, although the rule had been approved by the Supreme Court. See S. SALTZBURG, supra
note 187, at 757-59.
204. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Holloway argued that trial courts should normally be
able to conduct inquiries into the existence of conflicts of interest and counsel should normally be able
to state the basis of a conflict in concrete terms without violating client confidences. 435 U.S. at 493
n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205. United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1066 (1976).
206. Survey response of the Clark County [Las Vegas] Public Defender (1977) (on file with
author). This variation avoids a disclosure of potentially detrimental information to the judge who
may later be sentencing the defendant.
207. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); People v. Grigsby, 47 I1. App. 3d 812, 819 n.1, 365 N.E.2d 481, 486 n.1 (1977); Note,
Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to that of Former Client, 55 B.U.L.
REv. 61, 76 (1975); Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former
Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 926 (1955).
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as those in the defendant's case should require the granting of a motion to
withdraw without further investigation by the court. Indeed, it appears
that many courts already follow a modified form of the substantial rela-
tionship test by permitting counsel to make only a general statement of the
underlying conflict of interest.
5. Waiver or Consent by the Witness
Even when there is a substantial relationship between the defense law-
yer's earlier representation of a prosecution witness and the issues to be
raised in cross-examination, some courts have denied counsel's motion to
withdraw on the basis of the witness's waiver or consent.20 8 The rationale
is that once a witness consents to the defense lawyer's revealing the wit-
ness's confidences or secrets, counsel no longer is impaired in cross-
examination, and, as a result, Sixth Amendment problems are eliminated.
Case law on this issue, however, is unsettled. The distinction between the
evidentiary lawyer-client privilege and counsel's broader ethical obligation
to preserve confidential client information has proved to be particularly
confusing for several lower courts and commentators. 20 9 Although a few
courts have held that a witness's waiver of his attorney-client privilege
justifies denying counsel's motion to withdraw, 10 this result ignores the
substantial conflict of interest problems that continue even after a waiver
of the evidentiary privilege.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to pre-
serve both "confidences" and "secrets" of a client.2 11 Disciplinary Rule
DR 4-101(A) distinguishes between the two concepts by noting that "con-
fidences" refer to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
while "secrets" include "other information gained in the professional rela-
tionship. . . the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or. . . detri-
mental to the client."'212 In criminal cases, therefore, the lawyer must pre-
serve not only the communications made to him by the former client, but
also such matters in the former client's file as arrest reports, probation
reports, and psychiatric studies.
The bar has treated the lawyer's obligation to preserve confidential in-
formation as far broader than the evidentiary privilege: "This ethical pre-
208. See Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Par-
tin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Means v. Solem, 457 F. Supp. 1256,
1272 (D.S.D. 1978).
209. See Developments, supra note 72, at 1315.
210. See State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802, 813 (S.D. 1978).
211. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981).
212. Id. DR 4-101(A). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment
(1983) (confidentiality rule applies to all information relating to representation regardless of its
source).
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cept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature
or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." '
The bar adopted this broad concept of confidentiality because much of the
lawyer's information about a client usually comes from sources other than
the client. Criminal defense attorneys acquire substantial information
about clients from discovery, witness interviews, and probation officers
preparing pre-sentence investigation reports. Since counsel acquires this
information in a fiduciary capacity, a waiver of the evidentiary privilege
deals only with the tip of the iceberg.
A trial judge might look beyond the narrow evidentiary privilege and
ask a witness to consent to the defense lawyer's use of any information
acquired during the earlier representation.214 Although this approach may
be appropriate in some instances, in other cases there is a serious question
of whether a former client's consent, even if informed and unambiguous,
can justify a trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion to withdraw.
Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct distinguish between a lawyer's dis-
closing confidential information and his using that information against the
client. 15 For example, DR 4-101(C)(1) of the Code permits a lawyer to
"reveal" the confidences or secrets of a client with the client's informed
consent.216 On the other hand, DR 4-101(B) prohibits a lawyer both from
revealing confidential information and from "us[ing] a confidence or secret
.. .to the disadvantage of the client."'217 Therefore, although a client
may permit a lawyer to reveal confidential information, the lawyer can-
not-even with consent-use a client's secrets against the client. The dis-
tinction reflects an acknowledgement in the Code that a lawyer's use of
confidential information to the detriment of a client, when that informa-
tion was acquired as a result of the client's trust and confidence, is a more
213. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1981).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978) (absence of
waiver of "conflict of interest"); United States v. FMC Corp., 495 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(waiver of privilege and "any rights of confidentiality").
Some courts have followed this approach without any analysis or attempt to ascertain if the witness
understands what is at stake. See Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir. 1980).
This approach to obtaining the consent of the former client is markedly different from the courts'
treatment of the consent issue in civil disqualification cases. To be effective in a civil action, a former
client's consent must be informed. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. 493,
496 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Counsel in civil cases must disclose to the former client the legal implications
of any future conflict of interest. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 400 (S.D. Tex.
1969). The consent must also be unambiguous; any doubts about whether a knowing decision actually
was made by the former client have been resolved against the existence of a valid consent. IBM Corp.
v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 282 (3d Cir. 1978); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 573-74 (2d
Cir. 1973).
215. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.9 (1983).
216, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 4-101(C)(1) (1981).
217. Id. DR 4-101(b)(2).
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serious breach of professional responsibility than merely revealing confi-
dences or secrets.
This rationale arguably does not apply in criminal cases since the wit-
ness is not a party to the litigation and does not have an actual stake in
the outcome. Therefore, using particular information during cross-
examination of the witness technically is not using the information to the
"disadvantage" of the witness. In a broader sense, however, the distinction
between revealing confidential information and using it against the client
makes great sense in the criminal litigation cross-examination context.
When the lawyer's purpose is to attack the credibility of the witness, the
use of information acquired from a probation or police report can be both
humiliating to the witness and degrading to the witness's former lawyer.
A policy that precludes a witness's consent, after defense counsel has in-
formed the court that he possesses such confidential information and
moves to withdraw from the case, is quite reasonable.218
Protection of the defendant's interest is another reason to question the
validity of a witness's purported consent. Regardless of the witness's con-
sent, the lawyer may feel uncomfortable in conducting cross-
examination,21 9 and this discomfort may be communicated subtly to the
trier of fact. Of course, another lawyer may not be able to acquire the
information in question, but to the extent that substitute counsel can learn
the information from independent sources, that lawyer may be a better
advocate for the defendant. 2
It is not suggested here that a prosecution witness's consent to his for-
mer lawyer's representation of a defendant is never valid. On the con-
trary, such consent may be effective even when a substantial relationship
exists between the former representation and the contested issues in the
defendant's case. An important distinction should be drawn between a
conflict of interest premised on a substantial relationship between two cli-
ent representations, and a conflict that occurs when counsel informs the
court that he in fact possesses information from the earlier representation
that would be useful in challenging the witness's credibility. Since the for-
mer situation results in ethical problems primarily because of an appear-
ance of impropriety, the witness should be permitted to consent to the
218. Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules is instructive in this regard. Rule 1.9(a) prohibits successive
representation when the two client matters are substantially related. Rule 1.9(b) prohibits the use of
confidential information to the disadvantage of a former client. The comment to the rule makes clear
that the prohibition against successive representation can be waived by the former client. However,
the comment also reiterates the prohibition of Rule 1.6 against using confidential information to the
disadvantage of the client, without any reference to the client's consent or waiver. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 comment.
219. See United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1980).
220. See United States v. Morando, 628 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1980).
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lawyer's continuation in the case. On the other hand, effective representa-
tion of the defendant in the latter situation may require the lawyer to use
the information in question against the witness-precisely the circum-
stances in which the bar's ethical rules preclude a former client's consent.
Witness consent issues also arise in cases in which the government
moves to disqualify defense counsel. The disqualification cases raise the
question of the validity of the defendant's consent to counsel's continued
participation in the case, as well as the defendant's purported waiver of
his right to effective representation. Those issues are discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
C. Prosecution Moves to Disqualify Defense Counsel
The government moves before trial to disqualify defense counsel
from representing Joe, the defendant in a major prosecution. The
prosecution attorney alleges that there is a conflict of interest be-
tween Joe and Sue, who is a prospective witness for the government
and a former client of defense counsel. Joe's lawyer opposes the mo-
tion, and Joe states that he is willing to waive his right to an attor-
ney who is unimpaired by a conflict of interest. Sue informs the
court that she has no objection to the lawyer representing Joe, but
Sue does not waive her attorney-client privilege.
This illustration raises one of the most difficult procedural issues in
criminal cases: the extent to which a court may interfere with a defen-
dant's choice of counsel. Courts deciding disqualification motions in civil
cases often emphasize the current client's right to chosen counsel."2 ' That
right has a constitutional dimension in a criminal prosecution; the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to retain the lawyer of his
choice without unnecessary governmental interference.222 Even when the
court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant, it cannot discharge the
lawyer over the defendant's objection absent compelling justification.22 3
221. See Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1075 (1979); Magee v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 949, 950, 506 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1973).
223. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65 (1968). Smith has not been
overruled by the Court's recent decision in Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983). Slappy was
represented initially by Goldfine, a deputy public defender who was hospitalized for surgery shortly
before trial. The court appointed Hotchkiss to replace Goldfine six days before trial. Slappy requested
a continuance on each of the first two days of trial, alleging that Hotchkiss was not yet prepared,
although Slappy did not object to the appointment of Hotchkiss to represent him. The court denied
the continuance after Hotchkiss stated that in fact he was prepared to proceed. Five days into the
trial, Slappy informed the court that he would not cooperate with Hotchkiss since he regarded
Goldfine as his attorney. Slappy's conviction was affirmed by the state courts and the federal district
court denied habeas corpus relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, holding that the trial court
did not balance the defendant's interest in continuing with his appointed counsel with the state's
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Nevertheless, the courts have often granted prosecution motions to dis-
qualify defense counsel in recent years,224 and some courts have disquali-
fied lawyers on their own initiative.2 5 Since it is widely recognized that
the defendant's right to the counsel of his choice is not absolute, the pro-
priety of a disqualification depends on the circumstances of each case and
an analysis of the competing interests at stake. In the example introducing
this section, does the government have an interest in disqualification suffi-
cient to compel a disruption of the lawyer-client relationship when neither
Joe nor Sue objects to defense counsel's participation in the case? Can
Sue's confidentiality interest be protected adequately if the motion is de-
nied? What are the costs of disqualification to both Joe and his lawyer? If
Joe can waive his right to conflict-free counsel, must the court accept the
waiver and deny the motion? Finally, are there questions of public inter-
est that the court should consider in addition to the interests of Joe and
Sue?
1. The Government's Interest in Seeking Disqualification
The frequency of prosecution motions to disqualify criminal defense
lawyers has increased dramatically in recent years. 2 ' Although motions to
disqualify lawyers from representing multiple grand jury witnesses have
led to substantial controversy, 2 7 little attention has been paid to the rapid
interest in judicial efficiency, and thus violated the defendant's right to counsel. Slappy v. Morris, 649
F. 2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1981), ret/d, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not support the Ninth Circuit's conclu-
sion that Slappy had made a timely, good-faith request to continue with Goldfine. In sweeping dicta,
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court rejected the claim "that the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees a 'meaningful relationship' between an accused and his counsel." 103 S. Ct. at 1617 (footnote
omitted). Although concurring in the Court's judgment, four Justices objected to the dicta. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion emphasized the wisdom of decisions like Smith, and argued that the
Sixth Amendment should recognize the defendant's interest in preserving his relationship with a par-
ticular attorney. 103 S. Ct. at 1621 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Slappy is not authority for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel allows the
state to arbitrarily discharge a defendant's lawyer over the defendant's timely objection. Although the
Constitution does not guarantee attorney-client "rapport," 103 S. Ct. at 1617, nothing could strike a
greater blow to the concept of effective representation than a ruling that permits the state to remove a
defendant's lawyer without compelling justification.
224. See infra pp. 53-54.
225. See Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d
Cir. 1978).
226. A major cause of this development has been the expanded use of the grand jury as a vehicle
for investigating organized crime and white-collar offenses. A single lawyer or firm sometimes repre-
sents several grand jury witnesses to maintain a common defense strategy against the government's
efforts to investigate and prosecute the witnesses for suspected criminal offenses. The government, in
turn, may seek disqualification to break the joint representation and negotiate with one or more sus-
pects to testify against the others. See, e.g., In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); Pirillo v.
Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam on rehearing, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
227. See Lepone, Multiple Representation and Govern,ment Intrusion into the Attorney-Client
Relationship in Grand Jury Proceedings, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1147 (1980); Moore, Disqualification of an
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increase in prosecutors' disqualification motions to prevent defense law-
yers from cross-examining former clients at trial. Such motions were vir-
tually nonexistent a decade ago. 2 ' Recently, however, several appellate
court decisions each year have dealt with the issue, with little consistency
in the outcome of cases, and no analysis of the government's interest in
seeking disqualification. 2 '
Why should the government be permitted to challenge defense counsel's
participation in a case when the defendant desires to have the lawyer con-
tinue, especially when the prosecution's own witness has no objection to
his former lawyer representing the defendant?"'0 Disqualification motions
may be rationalized by a need to protect the witness's interest, regardless
of the witness's desire, or to further the public interest in a fair trial or an
ethical bar. Each of these rationales will be analyzed below. First, how-
ever, it is appropriate to consider the tactical motivations behind some
disqualification motions.
Disqualification motions in civil litigation are often motivated by ques-
tionable tactics rather than a true concern for clients' confidentiality."3 "
The elimination from a case of a formidable lawyer or firm as counsel for
an adversary can place the adversary at a competitive disadvantage.32 A
disqualification of counsel also can substantially increase an adversary's
costs and thereby induce a favorable settlement. 33 As a result, some courts
apply a stricter scrutiny than that of the substantial relationship test to
Attorney Representing Multiple Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall De-
fense, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1979); Note, Supervising Multiple Representation of Grand Jury
Witnesses, 57 B.U.L. REv. 544 (1977).
228. The first appellate court decisions concerning prosecution motions to disqualify defense coun-
sel based on alleged conflicts with former clients testifying for the government may have occurred no
earlier than 1975. See United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Shepard,
675 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1981).
230. For an example of these circumstances, see United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d
Cir. 1982).
231. See Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977); Woods v. Covington County Bank,
537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1138-39 (2d Cir.
1975); J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring);
Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Society for Goodwill to
Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Liebman, The Changing
Lau, of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996, 1015 (1979);
Shadur, Lauyers' Coqflicts of Interest: An OvenJew, 1977 CMu. B. REC. 190, 191; Comment, The
Ethics of Moving to Disqualify Opposing Counsel for Conflict of Interest, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1310,
1316-17.
232. See Huffman, Conflicts, Disqualifications Cause Persistent Headaches, Legal Times of
Washington, May 5, 1980, at 8, col. 2.
233. Id.
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such motions to avoid disqualifications made solely or primarily for tacti-
cal advantage.234
There are reasons to believe that some motions to disqualify counsel in
criminal cases are also filed for tactical advantage rather than the protec-
tion of confidential information on behalf of a former client of defense
counsel. In United States v. Cunningham,235 for example, the government
moved to disqualify a lawyer who had represented the defendant for over
six years in related matters, had succeeded in having four previous indict-
ments against Cunningham dismissed, and had successfully represented
the defendant before the United States Supreme Court. The former client
refused to join the government's disqualification motion, and naturally the
defendant himself desired that his repeatedly successful lawyer continue to
represent him. Since the lawyer's earlier representation of the government
witness had been quite limited in scope, 38 the defendant did not derive an
unfair advantage from the alleged conflict. In short, it is difficult to view
the government's motion in Cunningham as anything but an attempt to
rid itself of a highly successful lawyer and to harass a defendant who had
repeatedly escaped unscathed from prior attempts to prosecute him.
Another tactical purpose for disqualification motions in criminal cases
is to prevent a witness from becoming sympathetic to the defense. Liti-
gators have long been aware that when a witness identifies with one party
or another and understands how his testimony fits into his side's eviden-
tiary case, he is likely to slant his version of the facts to further the
case. 1 7 Psychological battles for the allegiance of a neutral witness are
common.238 When a government witness is a former client of defense
counsel, the prosecutor may face an uphill battle to secure the witness's
favor. Disqualification of counsel can ease the prosecutor's burden.
The notion that a witness's allegiance can color his testimony is trou-
blesome for an adjudicatory system that places a premium on accuracy
and fairness in reconstructing events and transactions.23 9 Even more
troubling, however, is the fact that a defendant's lawyer-client relationship
can be severed as a result of such questionable tactics. Unfortunately, a
trial judge deciding whether to disqualify counsel can never be certain if
any tactics of this nature lurk behind an otherwise colorable disqualifica-
234. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
235. 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982).
236. Id. at 1067, 1073.
237. See A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY 172 (2d ed. 1982).
238. See R. SIMMONS, WINNING BEFORE TRIAL: How TO PREPARE CASES FOR THE BEST SET-
TLEMENT OR TRIAL RESULT 305-13 (1974).
239. For an interesting discussion of this subject, see G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAW-
YERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 391-92, 412-15 (1978).
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tion motion. What the judge can do, however, is make certain that the
government's legitimate interest in seeking disqualification is strong.
When the former client of defense counsel testifying for the government
desires disqualification to preserve confidential information, the govern-
ment's interest in seeking disqualification seems strongest.240 Unlike a
party in a civil action, the prosecution witness usually is not represented
by counsel, and the government lawyer should qualify as a reasonable
surrogate for purposes of the disqualification motion. The government
also has a strong interest in seeking disqualification when defense counsel
is a former prosecutor who participated in related government investiga-
tions of the defendant.24 In this case, the government itself is in a sense
the former client of defense counsel, and the prosecution may well be jus-
tified in seeking to protect the integrity of its own investigation process
and to prevent an unfair advantage for the defense at trial. Absent these
special circumstances, the prosecution should shoulder a heavy burden to
demonstrate that either the witness's interest in confidentiality or the pub-
lic's interest in a fair trial support disqualification.
2. -The Former Client's Interest in Disqualification
The prosecution witness's desire to keep confidential all information ac-
quired during a prior representation is an important factor for the court
to weigh in determining whether to disqualify counsel.2"2 Yet it is also
possible that the witness may not oppose counsel's representation of the
defendant.243 Unfortunately, the courts frequently decide disqualification
matters in criminal cases without taking the witness's position into
account.2 4
The witness's opposition to defense counsel's representation of the de-
fendant is especially important in those cases in which the court finds a
substantial relationship between the earlier representation and the defen-
dant's case.2 45 The risk that counsel acquired confidential information
240. See United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978).
241. See United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d
900 (5th Cir. 1979); People v. Hoskins, 392 N.E.2d 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); People v. Horton, 391
N.E.2d 498 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979). If the defense lawyer was formerly employed as a prosecutor and in
that capacity prosecuted the defendant on an unrelated charge, disqualification will be denied. See
United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1981); People v. Franklin, 75 Ill. 2d 173, 177-79,
387 N.E.2d 685, 687 (1979).
242. See United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978).
243. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1068 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
FMC Corp., 495 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Shepard, 675 F.2d 977, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1979); Commonwealth v. Connor, 410 N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1980); State v. Morelli, 152 N.J. Super.
67, 377 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
245. Some courts are beginning to apply the substantial relationship terminology from the civil
disqualification cases to situations in which the government moves to disqualify defense counsel in
criminal cases. See United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 971-72 (8th Cir. 1982).
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useful for cross-examination is especially great in these circumstances.
Even though the defendant may be willing to waive his right to conflict-
free representation, the waiver should not be given effect if there is a
strong chance that the witness may be harmed by the conflict and he is
unwilling to consent to counsel's participation in the case.246 This situa-
tion is analogous to other circumstances in which a disability or lack of
availability of defense counsel overrides a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of his choice.24 7 On the other hand, if the relationship
between the earlier representation and the foreseeable issues in the case
before the court is not particularly strong, the risk of an ethical violation
is small and the defendant's choice of counsel should prevail.248 In addi-
tion, the court may be able, through measures short of disqualification, to
minimize the danger that confidential information will be used
improperly.2 49
A careful distinction should be drawn between a witness's refusal to
agree to his former lawyer's representation of the defendant in a substan-
tially related case and a witness's refusal to waive the attorney-client priv-
ilege. In the former situation, the witness is asserting his right to keep his
lawyer from turning against him on a matter which he previously en-
trusted to his lawyer. However, the former client may not oppose the law-
yer's representation of the defendant, but instead may merely wish to pre-
serve the confidentiality of information the lawyer learned in the earlier
representation. In the latter instance, the defendant's waiver of the conflict
of interest may be effective if the court requires counsel to adhere to the
witness's desire in cross-examination.2 50
In some cases the court may have to disqualify counsel even though the
witness waives the attorney-client privilege and the defendant objects to
disqualification. In United States v. Siegner,2 51 the court found not only
246. See United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1978) (defendant's counsel was
not licensed by state to practice law); Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975) (indigent
defendant required to accept counsel provided by state rather than counsel of his own choosing);
United States ex. rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969) (defendant must accept repre-
sentation by public defender when counsel of choice not available at start of trial), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 946 (1970).
248. But see Commonwealth v. Connor, 410 N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1980) (upholding trial court's
holding that although defense counsel's prior representation of prosecution witness was unrelated,
counsel disqualified).
249. See infra p. 63.
250. These were the circumstances in United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1982), in which the Second Circuit ruled that the defendant could effectively waive conflict-free coun-
sel so long as the lawyer restricted cross-examination to matters that were included in the public
record. Id. at 1073. See also United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975) (wit-
nesses who were previous clients of defense counsel entitled to full protection of their privileged
communications).
251. 498 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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that defense counsel had represented an important prosecution witness on
a related matter, but also that counsel actually received confidential infor-
mation from the witness that would be essential for cross-examination.252
Although the court did not discuss the question of whether the witness
consented to the conflict, the witness's consent here would not have been
dispositive. The court's disqualification of counsel was appropriate be-
cause the lawyer would have had to use the confidential information to
the detriment of the witness. Disqualification in these circumstances re-
flects the bar's conflict-of-interest rules: A client or former client can con-
sent to counsel's revealing confidential information, but not to the use of
that information against the client himself.253
Protection of the witness's interest is sometimes dispositive of the dis-
qualification issue because an actual conflict of interest is manifest to the
trial court. This situation, however, rarely occurs. In most cases the court
can only assess the risk that a conflict will occur because of the relation-
ship between the two matters of client representation. This assessment
should be based upon the substantial relationship principle applied in civil
cases, and must include a balancing of the witness's interest with the de-
fendant's due process rights and the public interest in a fair adversarial
process. These considerations, and the relative weights to be accorded
them in the balancing process, will be discussed in the following two
sections.
3. The Defendant's Interest in Keeping the Lawyer of his Choice
To avoid disqualification of his counsel, the defendant may offer to
waive his right to representation by a lawyer who is unimpaired by a
conflict of interest.2 ' The rationale is that if a defendant can waive the
252. Id. at 285.
253. See supra pp. 50-51.
Another case illustrates the applicability of the A.B.A.'s position that a client sometimes may not
consent to a conflict of interest. In United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978), counsel
represented co-defendants. One client pleaded guilty and then was called as a prosecution witness at
the remaining client's trial even though he had not yet been sentenced. Id. at 1179. When the court
stated that it believed there was a conflict of interest between the two clients, counsel replied that he
would avoid the conflict by instructing the witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege by not
testifying about the facts of the case before his sentencing hearing. The court declared a mistrial and
disqualified counsel from representing both clients. Id. at 1179-80. The Third Circuit affirmed, tak-
ing the position that a "waiver of the conflict of interest" could not cure the problem. Id. at 1184.
Dolan was correctly decided, because the potential ethical impropriety resulting from joint repre-
sentation had ripened into an actual conflict of interest when one client became a prosecution witness.
No matter what counsel did under the circumstances of the case, he would cause harm for one of his
clients. If he proceeded to advise the witness to refuse to answer questions about the facts of the case,
the witness's lack of cooperation with the government might jeopardize his position at the upcoming
sentencing hearing, but permitting the witness to testify would jeopardize the defendant's opportunity
for an acquittal.
254. See United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 883 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cunning-
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right to counsel itself, he should also be able to waive the right to effective
assistance of counsel, which is a component of the broader right.255 Sup-
port for this argument can be found in Faretta v. California,256 in which
the Supreme Court recognized the right of a defendant to defend himself
without the aid of counsel even though self-representation might be inef-
fective.2 57 Applying this reasoning in Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court
acknowledged that a defendant may waive the right to the assistance of an
attorney unhindered by a conflict of interest.258 However, the Court has
not yet delineated the circumstances in which such a waiver may override
a disqualification motion.25 9
Without Supreme Court guidance, the lower courts have taken diver-
gent positions on the effectiveness of a defendant's waiver in overcoming a
motion to disqualify counsel.2 60 Yet within the apparently contradictory
holdings, courts have often implicitly balanced the defendant's interest in
keeping the lawyer of his choice with the other affected interests. When
interests other than those of the defendant are weak, the defendant should
ordinarily be permitted to waive a possible conflict of interest. These cir-
cumstances occur when the predominant purpose of a disqualification of
counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. The defendant
should be permitted to waive that guarantee, so long as the court deter-
mines that his decision is a knowing and voluntary one.261
ham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1982). If the defendant refuses to waive his right to a lawyer
unimpaired by a conflict of interest, disqualification may be appropriate. See United States v. Greger,
657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981).
255. See United States v. Mahar, 550 F.2d 1005, 1008 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Armedo-
Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975).
256. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
257. Id. at 834.
258. 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5 (1978).
259. The Court declined to resolve the issue in Holloway because it was not argued that defen-
dants had waived their right to conflict-free counsel. Id.
260. The Second Circuit reversed a district court order disqualifying defense counsel in a succes-
sive representation case, even though the trial court found that a substantial relationship existed and
two former clients of defense counsel testifying for the government refused to waive their attorney-
client privilege. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second
Circuit overturned the disqualification order because the trial court did not afford the defendant an
opportunity to waive his right to conflict-free representation. Id. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
refused to permit a defendant's waiver of effective representation because the prosecution witness
refused to waive the conflict of interest. United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th
Cir. 1978). Without regard to the witness's position, other courts have found a purported waiver by
the defendant invalid to overcome the appearance of impropriety. See Commonwealth v. Connor, 410
N.E.2d 709, 712-13 (Mass. 1980); State v. Morelli, 152 N.J. Super. 67, 70-74, 377 A.2d 774,
774-78 (1977). Finally, at least one appellate court has upheld a disqualification order over the de-
fendant's objection, simply finding that there was no knowing and voluntary waiver, without any
analysis of the issue. See Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 31-32 (8th Cir. 1978).
261. For example, an attempt to disqualify counsel from the joint representation of co-defendants
is normally not premised on the need to protect the confidences of a prosecution witness or the integ-
rity of the fact-finding process, but rather on the risk that counsel's divided loyalty will harm the
defendants themselves. Co-defendants in this situation therefore should be permitted to waive their
right to conflict-free counsel. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
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On the other hand, when protection of the confidentiality rights of a
government witness is at stake or when the court concludes that the de-
fense may acquire an unfair advantage from counsel's prior representation
of a witness, the court should assess the strength of the defendant's inter-
est in keeping his lawyer. The cost of disqualification for the defendant
may vary considerably with each case. In addition, the court should con-
sider the extent of the hardship that disqualification creates for defense
counsel.
One factor affecting the cost of disqualification for both the defendant
and counsel is the maturity of their attorney-client relationship. If the
lawyer has represented the defendant on other occasions, and is familiar
with the defendant's family and background as well as the circumstances
of the defendant's prior contacts with the courts, disqualification of coun-
sel is particularly costly to the defendant.262 A longer association with
counsel also allows for the development of confidence and rapport, two
essential ingredients in a criminal defendant's relationship with his
lawyer.268
Another factor affecting the cost of disqualification is the timing. Pre-
trial preparation may entail considerable effort and expense. Substitute
counsel will find it necessary to duplicate many of the tasks undertaken by
the disqualified lawyer, creating even greater expense for the defendant. 2"
Of course, if the defendant is indigent, the public must bear the additional
financial burden created by a disqualification of defense counsel. This also
is a pertinent consideration for the court.265
262. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982) (dismissal of
counsel who represented defendant through six-year investigation could subject defendant to "real
prejudice").
263. See 3 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES 1-63 (1974).
264. When courts decide disqualification motions in civil cases, they often give substantial weight
to the expense and inconvenience the disqualification motion causes the current client. See Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677
(2d Cir. 1976); Government of India v. Cook Indus., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Similarly, courts sometimes rely on the doctrine of laches to deny disqualification when the motion is
filed long after the litigation has begun and the opposing party has committed substantial resources to
the case. See Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); White v. Superior Court, 98
Cal. App. 3d 51, 55-56, 159 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (1979).
In a criminal case, the defendant may experience additional difficulty in trying to obtain from his
original lawyer a refund of that portion of the fee which the lawyer cannot fairly retain for work
already expended on the case. See People v. Blalock, 592 P.2d 406, 408 (Colo. 1979); People v.
Manos, 66 A.D.2d 922, 923, 410 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (1978). If, however, defense counsel was remiss
in not discovering or reporting the conflict at an earlier stage in the proceedings, the court may order
him to return a portion of the fee. See Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1978) (court has
inherent power to inquire into amount charged by an attorney in order to protect client from excessive
fees).
265. The court's own expense is a fair consideration to be weighed in deciding a disqualification
motion, at least in some circumstances. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
466 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("needs of efficient judicial administration" must be weighed
against possible "advantage of immediate preventive measures" in disqualification motions).
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There are other costs of disqualification for the defendant, often intan-
gible but nevertheless considerable. For example, there is a substantial
value in continuity of representation in preparation for trial.26 A thor-
ough assessment of a disqualification motion involves weighing all these
costs against the interest of the government witness and the court's own
interest in the integrity and efficiency of the judicial process.
4. The Court's Interest in Disqualification
It is misleading to discuss the court's own interest in a disqualification
motion independently of the interests of the government, witness, and de-
fendant because those respective interests in large part define the public
interest in each case. For example, if in a particular case the risk of de-
fense counsel making improper use of confidential information in a client's
file is small, the government's concern that the defense will have an unfair
advantage is minimized. The public interest is therefore subordinate to the
court's obligation to assure the defendant's right to counsel of his choice.
Nevertheless, it is useful to analyze disqualification from the court's view-
point to place each of the parties' interests in perspective. There are also
aspects of the court's interest that diverge from those of the parties and
that may require the granting or denial of disqualification in an individ-
ual case.
Some courts, for example, have disqualified defense counsel on the
ground that the lawyer's familiarity with a former client testifying for the
government has resulted in an unfair advantage for the defense, frustrat-
ing the equity of the adversary process. 67 This rationale, however, can be
used either as a justification for a decision to disqualify counsel or as a
means to limit disqualification to those situations in which the lawyer's
familarity with the witness actually has an impact on the competitive bal-
ance of the trial. The latter approach respects the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the considerable hardships that result
from a disqualification order. 6 8
266. A lawyer who has cross-examined prosecution witnessses at a preliminary hearing or in pre-
trial motions is familiar with the manner in which those witnesses respond to questions and the way
in which they relate to him in a courtroom setting. Such insight can be invaluable in planning cross-
examination for trial. Substitute counsel not only loses these advantages of continuity, but must also
prepare for trial more quickly. This can be a serious problem when there are numerous witnesses in
the case and time is important-either because the defendant is in custody or because the speedy trial
requirements of the jurisdiction limit the duration of pre-trial continuances. See Speedy Trial Act of
1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1981).
267. See United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979); State v. Morelli, 152 N.J.
Super. 67, 73-74, 377 A.2d 774, 777 (1977).
268. An analogous situation occurs in connection with government motions to disqualify defense
counsel from representing multiple grand jury witnesses. The courts sometimes disqualify counsel if
they conclude that the integrity of the grand jury itself is threatened by multiple representation. See In
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The Second Circuit has formulated a doctrine in civil cases that utilizes
concern for fairness in the adversarial process as a necessary condition for
disqualification. That court concluded in Board of Education v. Ny-
quist6 9 that disqualification should be ordered only "where necessary to
perserve the integrity of the adversary process" 270 or to prevent an unfair
advantage that will "taint the underlying trial."27 1 Restricting disqualifi-
cation to situations in which the public interest is impaired was necessary,
according to the court, not only because of the hardship imposed by a
disqualification order but also because disqualification is sought fre-
quently for reasons of tactical advantage rather than true concern for pro-
tecting confidential information.27 2
The Nyquist doctrine makes sense when applied in criminal cases. An
imbalance in the adversary process can occur, for example, when counsel
is in possession of police reports, psychiatric evaluations, or presentence
investigation reports from the earlier representation and those reports or
evaluations of the witness are useful for cross-examination on related is-
sues. However, disqualification may be too extreme a remedy in many
cases, especially when the costs of disqualification are substantial for the
defendant. Questionable tactical motivations for disqualification motions
are just as likely in criminal cases as they are in civil litigation, and the
principle of respecting a litigant's choice of counsel is constitutionally
compelled in criminal cases.
Applying Nyquist to successive representation in criminal cases would
not entail a departure from established principles. Nyquist's concept of
"preserving the integrity of the adversarial process" includes, of course,
those cases in which "the attorney is at least potentially in a position to
use privileged information concerning the other side.''21 3 These circum-
stances would occur when a substantial relationship exists between the
prior representation and the contested issues in the current case, and the
re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury,
531 F.2d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 529-30, 341 A.2d 896, 901
(1975), affd per curiarn on rehearing, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
Joint representation can frustrate the grand jury's investigative function if it results in witness collu-
sion or if the secrecy of the proceedings is undermined. Although some courts have assumed that the
integrity of the grand jury process is impaired by the mere fact of joint representation, see In re
Gopman, 531 F.2d at 266, other decisions have required the government to produce concrete evidence
that the attorney's continued representation of multiple witnesses would obstruct the grand jury's
investigation, see SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The latter approach uses the
public interest not as a rationalization for disqtialifying counsel, but instead as a necessary condition
for disqualification, to permit interference with the witness's free choice of counsel only when it can
be shown to infect the fact-finding process.
269. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
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earlier lawyer-client relationship was such that the lawyer had access to
the type of information that could be useful in cross-examining the wit-
ness. In addition, if the witness is very important to the prosecution's case
and the assessment by the trier of fact of the witness's credibility is cru-
cial, the fact-finding process is likely to be affected by any conflict of in-
terest. Since the public interest in preserving the integrity of the fact-
finding process is, under Nyquist, a necessary condition for the imposition
of disqualification, trial courts should require the government to make a
concrete showing, as part of the inquiry into the existence of a substantial
relationship, that the adversarial process may be impaired, before granting
disqualification over the defendant's objection.
In weighing the public interest, the court should also consider both the
costs of disqualification to the administration of justice and the avaliable
alternatives to disqualification. Particularly when disqualification occurs
shortly before the scheduled date of trial in a case involving complex or
protracted issues, it can result in substantial expense and delay, upsetting
the efficient operation of a court calendar, causing inconvenience for wit-
nesses, and interfering with the public interest in a speedy trial. On the
other hand, viable alternatives that preserve the fairness of the fact-finding
process may exist.27 ' For example, defense counsel and the defendant may
agree to restrict cross-examination to matters not closely related to the
prior client-lawyer relationship.2 7 The court might also consider after the
fact discipline of defense counsel as an alternative to the preventative rem-
edy of disqualification.278
V. CONCLUSION
The tendency of the courts to overlook the complexities of successive
representation and the lack of coherence in dealing with the resulting
274. One alternative to disqualification recently discussed approvingly by the Eighth Circuit
would be for the defendant to retain, or the court to appoint, a back-up counsel who would conduct
the cross-examination of the problem witness. This would permit the defendant's counsel of choice to
remain in the case, conducting all other phases of the trial. See United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965,
974 (8th Cir. 1982); Tague, supra note 10, at 1115. This approach should be considered with cau-
tion, however, since the cross-examination will have to be coordinated with the other aspects of the
trial, particularly the closing argument for the defense. Preparation by back-up counsel for the cross-
examination might be difficult and time-consuming in some cases, reducing significantly the advan-
tages to be gained.
275. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982).
276. Several courts have held that they have inherent authority to supervise the practice of attor-
neys appearing before them. See Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1978). Presumably, this is
the authority courts exercise when they disqualify lawyers or firms from particular cases. See United
States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1982). When a privately retained lawyer has provided
ineffective assistance of counsel for a criminal defendant because of a conflict of interest or a lack of
diligence, some courts have exercised their supervisory power to reduce the lawyer's fee and order a
return of money paid to the lawyer by the client. See Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d at 32; United States v.
Vague, 521 F. Supp. 147, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Whether analogous sanctions could be applied against
salaried public defenders is not clear.
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problems can be traced to three sources. First, the bar itself ignored suc-
cessive representation as an issue worthy of analysis in its rules of profes-
sional responsibility, at least before the recently proposed Model Rules.
Without a normative framework to provide guidance to practitioners, in-
dividual lawyers have formulated their own rules of conduct, with no uni-
formity. Second, unlike joint representation of criminal co-defendants, suc-
cessive representation in criminal defense is not a highly visible
phenomenon. When it occurs, the trial court usually is unaware of the
risk that a conflict of interest may develop. Third, the former client in
criminal litigation is not a party and is not represented by counsel. There-
fore, there is no mechanism similar to the disqualification motion in civil
litigation to bring the issue to the attention of the trial court for prevent-
ative action.
If more direction is provided to criminal lawyers in the first instance,
and trial courts are alerted to the circumstance of successive representation
sufficiently in advance of trial to avert potential problems, the fairness and
reliability of the criminal justice system will be increased. Rule 1.9 of the
Model Rules is a step in the right direction, especially if ambiguities in
the language of the rule can be eliminated.77 Since Rule 1.9 presumably
applies the civil disqualification standard to criminal practitioners, a logi-
cal innovation in criminal procedure would be the adoption of a mecha-
nism similar to the civil disqualification motion to raise the issue in the
criminal courts. Avoiding a potential problem before it has the opportu-
nity to arise certainly is preferable to speculating about its effect after-the-
fact or ignoring it completely, as now occurs too frequently.
A pre-trial judicial inquiry to determine the existence and potential ef-
fects of successive representation is sorely needed. Although the approach
suggested in this article will not eliminate the problems of. divided loyalty
that occur when a former client of defense counsel testifies for the prose-
cution, at least it will assure that each player in the drama is acting with
an awareness of the risks. The judicial inquiry approach will not elimi-
nate adversarial abuses of the disqualification mechanism. However, if
disqualification is seen as a careful balancing of the competing interests in
each case, the risk of disqualification motions based on questionable mo-
tives can be minimized. An ounce of prevention truly is worth a pound of
cure.
277. See supra pp. 22, 23.
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